Is the Religious Feeling the Social Element of Religion?

“Once there is religion, it must necessarily be social. That not only lies in human nature but also preeminently in the nature of religion.” (73 Cambridge)

To Schleiermacher, religion is necessarily social because society is a part of human nature, and thus in the nature of religion. He provides multiple premises to support his claim and is tolerant of multiple religious views. However, he does not consider that while the feeling is common in human nature, the understanding of the feeling and of the infinite is what gives religion its social element.

In this philosophy of religion, the individual needs to communicate the religious feeling. One needs to make sure that it is not “alien” or “unworthy” of submission (73). The religious feeling is plausible if others can relate to it. And because others can relate, and by the same token testify to it, it is our “shared nature” (73). Thereby, in this view, communicating the feeling for verification makes it social. Schleiermacher does not account for the use of language and symbols in communicating the feeling. What makes the verification successful is if others understand it. Otherwise, the feeling is cast aside as absurd.

Another reason to communicate the religious feeling is because the feeling forces one out of oneself, so that one cannot know oneself through oneself alone (73). This aspect is the grasping of the infinitude of the feeling. Because it is bigger than the individual (since it is of the infinite), the individual gains impetus to spread the feeling. Schleiermacher claims this is not making others like ourselves, but simply sharing “particular events” common to human nature (73). Schleiermacher wants to account that the religious feeling is common to mankind, but does not consider that not everyone can relate to another’s religious feeling, merely because it is religious. What makes a religion is the representation of the object of worship, not the object itself, i.e. the infinite.

Schleiermacher himself maintains a high level of tolerance for other religious views, and he does not see the differences in representations as a complication. The most cultivated religions are more universal (77), and so the true church is an association of those who share the intuition of the infinite. If the feeling is truly of the infinite, it must be all encompassing. This is problematic, because it inadvertently implies that the bigger, or more “cultured”, a religious society is, the more truth it holds. The “smaller” representations of the infinite (tribes and small cults) are dismissed as less true. Schleiermacher does not actually see a common religious feeling. He is aiming at a common religious representation.

In Schleiermacher’s view, is the religious feeling the social element of religion? The feeling is necessary, but it is not the social element. What makes religion social is the understanding of the infinite, which comes from a common representation of it. Others must relate to the feeling that drives one out of oneself for it to not seem alien. And although Schleiermacher seems like he is universalizing the intuition, he may just be universalizing its representation.