Post #1

"The Christian conception of God - God as God of the sick, God as spider, God as spirit - is one of the most corrupt conceptions of God arrived at on earth: perhaps it even represents the low water mark in the descending development of the God type. God degenerated to the contradiction of life instead of being its transfiguration and eternal Yes! " (Section 18)

As we have unpacked Nietzsche's despise for Christianity, an outline of his major critique lies in his concept of life as a power or force and Christian tradition as a practice in which no longer allows its proper expression. Christianity instead consists of a conception of consciousness that punishes us, asking of us to internalize outward expression of instinct and aggression and inflicts an overarching affliction of guilt in the process. This form of "bad conscience" nihilism is a result of the degradation of life expression since the Greeks. The Greek or "barbarian", non-rational morality focused on the life expressive way of being. With the introduction of Christianity we have an inversion of the aforementioned "master morality" and thus our instincts are turn upon one another. Nietzsche highlights here points which Freud will later take off on in The Pleasure Principle such as his explanation of anxiety. Freud makes a point to explain that anxiety, as a completely internalized fear of our choices, is the one of the most dangerous emotions as we are in a battle not against the oppression of others, but of ourselves to which we have less defense. Nietzsche's concern with Christianity perpetuated guilt can be seen as creating a fictitious internal battle with anxiety which has been allowed to become tradition of the most dangerous kind. Nietzsche's critique can be seen as an attempt to reinstall an experience of existence that is genuine in the face of nihilism.

Worth noting again is the effect of pity as a vice for this Christian conception of guilt. Pity on others, an emotion whose purpose is to liken your emotions to others who are in pain in order to share in their suffering is another example of "God as sick" to Nietzsche. The tradition within religion here not only pushes the nihilism associated with life to a concept of fulfillment of an afterlife (denial) as well as make one feel guilty for not being able to live of to the highest standards granted in the afterlife on their time on earth, but then twists the knife one more time and breeds on the commiseration and comradeship of being in this situation together. This system may have an illusion of good and progress but these illusions instigate Nietsche's tirade against it.

Pity the fool obsessed with power

Section seven focuses on Nietzsche condemnation of pity. He writes "pity stands in antithesis to the tonic emotions which enhances the energy of the feeling of life: it has a depressive effect…..suffering becomes contagious.” (130)

Nietzsche sees pity as one of those present aspects of morality that is actually an inversion of true morality. By regarding pity as a grand virtue it has made people weaker. He sees pity as problematic because it multiplies sorrow, weakens everyone, and preserves that which is "ripe for destruction."

I find it interesting that Nietzsche uses the word "pity" as opposed to compassion or sympathy. The word pity has a connotation of power within it. To pity someone is to be above them looking down; it draws images of the rich looking down upon the poor pitying that they were not born so lucky. Pity also has an inactive sense about it, to pity someone usually denotes a passive twinge of guilt or sadness. Easily done, ”Oh I feel bad," while walking by the homeless man on the street.

When a tragedy befalls someone it is common to hear "I don't want anyone's pity," but I have never heard someone say "I don't want anyone's compassion." Nietzsches use of the word pity is a straw-man technique. Pity isn't a virtue that should be preserved, it is self-righteous and has a feeling of power engrained within it.

Compassion on the other hand is a virtue that should be preserved and does not have a depressing effect, does not increase sorrow, and does not preserve that which should be destroyed.

Nietzsche seems to have a keen interest in evolution; if he looked at the evolution of homo sapiens he would see that we are social animals; the only reason our species survived is through preserving of the group. (ie: alarm calling)

While I agree that pity is a waste of emotion compassion has ensured the survival of our species and will continue to be a cornerstone on what brings comfort and peace when tragedy befalls people.

Why does Friedrich Nietzsche passionately despise Christianity?

Friedrich Nietzsche has cultivated many rational reasons why Christianity is a disease on society. A couple of which include: 1) he believes that Christianity is a religion of pity, and 2) it stands in opposition of intellectual growth.

“What is good? – All that heightens the feeling of power, the will to power, power itself in man.” (p.125, l. 26)

Rationally it can be safely stated that the majority of the population accept Christianity as being good, it can also be stated that religion is controlling.

“Pity is practical nihilism. To say it again, this depressive and contagious instinct thwarts those instincts bent on preserving and enhancing the value of life: both as a multiplier of misery and as a conservator of everything miserable it is one of the chief instruments for the advancement of decadence” (p. 128, l. 26)

Christianity and its collective interpretation looks down upon the desires of human beings, causing them to pity themselves and feel sorrow because of their natural instincts. As in the previous quote what is good is what heightens feeling and energy; since self-pity is a depressive activity to participate in, it can be said that self-pitying oneself is bad, therefore to Nietzsche Christianity is not good.

“Christianity, the typical Christian condition, ‘faith’, has to be a form of sickness, every straightforward, honest, scientific road to knowledge has to be repudiated by the Church as a forbidden road. Even to doubt is a sin”

As previously stated in Pauline’s post, Christianity supports that which is weak. Maybe because science is so straightforward, has proof, and is such a strong subject to argue against, the institution of Christianity is against it. Another reason may be is that they fear that the public might view science as being right, and begin to believe in science rather than the church; listening to scientists, rather than preachers. The fact that the institution of Christianity forbids intellectual growth only will lead people to it (remember the forbidden fruit?). Anyway, leaving people in a state of ignorance is what Nietzsche is saying the institution of Christianity wants.

Even though there are these dissenting traits of Christianity that Nietzsche chooses to focus on, there is also a humanitarian side that he fails to accept. (p.196) Nietzsche seems to understand the faults in Christianity, as well as many other worldly religions and people throughout this book. Even though Nietzsche has rationally developed countless numbers of logical proofs on how the institution of Christianity is bad, it seems as if he only recognized the bad and chosen to exploit them.

Nietzsche's formula to happiness; yes, no, straight line, goal.

Nietzsche is one of the more intriguing characters in the philosophical realm. Throughout his works he weaves his way in and out many ideas, criticizing Kant, Religion (very heavy criticism), the origin of morals, the concept of “good”, and many other abstract ideas. As I weaved my way through his web, I can only sit and ask what was his true happiness and is there anything for that matter that makes Nietzsche happy. What can make a man, a philosopher-who seems to claim everything is it’s own a deterioration of life-happy? Then all of a sudden, a breakthrough in the first section of The Anti-Christ (also in the Maxims and Arrows in The Twilight of The Idols), we have a formula to happiness, now there is no need to spend time looking for Nietzsche’s happiness or should we rather continue? “…a yes, a no, a straight line, a goal…” (Nietzsche 127) So before the formula is broken down and understood we must come to understand something worthy of note. If someone-Nietzsche in this case-is able to invest a large amount of time of their life putting pencil to paper and write their thoughts and ideas which cover a grand spectrum of topics. There is most obviously some sort of a “goal” which is most definitely related to happiness and the fulfillment of some sort of gratification. Through a sheer anthropological account we as people, as animals, work for a self-fulfilling purpose, Nietzsche himself, sadly enough doesn’t escape this. So whether The Anti-Christ or Thus Spoke Zarathustra, or even Dr. Seuss’ The Cat in the Hat for that matter, the writer writes with some sort of expectation in the end, in this case it is for some sort of satisfaction. Writing a book logically connects the act of writing with happiness or rather the expectation of a positive result. With the help of The Anti-Christ Nietzsche’s formula will be broken down and applied to his work to figure out what are the pieces of the formula and how they can be applied to this work.

First we begin with the “yes” of the formula, yes is a word which one uses to affirm (agree with) a statement. Nietzsche with the yes is affirming his very own position, meaning his ideas; the yes is also a universal yes, in the sense that it applies to all people; those who are willing to listen especially. “Formula of our happiness: a Yes, a No…” The “our” shows some kind of union between people, in this case the union is between Nietzsche and his listeners. The No; again we must make a basis of the word No itself, it is “used as a function word to express the negative of an alternative” (Merriam Webster Dictionary 489) Now that we have established the No, we must realize the correlation between No and The Anti-Christ. “One should not embellish or dress up Christianity: it has waged a war to the death against this higher type of man,…” (Nietzsche 129) then we have this “I make war on this theologian instinct: I have found traces of it everywhere. Whoever has theologian blood in his veins has a wrong and dishonest attitude…” (Nietzsche 132). Time and time again we have evidence of the refusal of Christianity, the “No” in his formula of happiness. Now we have the “straight line”, what do we associate with straight lines? Forward movement in a physical sense, in mathematical discourse it continues ad infinitum. This is the path which Nietzsche takes along with his willing listeners, they do not deviate off the line but rather follow every step, sort of in the way a straight line will never deviate and become perpendicular, the path itself mustn’t be deviated from because then Nietzsche loses his happiness and the formula is wrong. Now we have the “goal”, the goal can be a combination of things, it can be getting his greater message across, and it can also be the success and the posthumous glorification that Nietzsche receives. A tandem of words, events, ideas, has created the recipe to Nietzsche’s happiness, a happiness and formula which he knew very well of but he had said rather opaquely.

Faith v. Natural Instinct (Blog Post #3)

Is Christianity the cause of humankind’s decline? Perhaps not specifically Christianity as much as what any extreme giving of oneself over to any cultural or religious structure, which may lead to the relinquishing of rational thinking and submission to systematic forces that are not questioned.

Nietzsche delves deeply into the dangers of people positioning themselves within a system of beliefs where faith is the root. Such faith can perpetuate and/or excuse non-moral behavior and/or irrational behavior. How is that better than living without any structure, without any rules of conduct wherein a supreme being is believed to be the ultimate judge and dictator? When nations clash and cultural differences lead to war, violence and hostility, where is the value in faith then? It is this notion that Nietzche touches on when he refers to the “Evil One”. “Christianity has taken the side of everything weak, base, ill-constituted, it has made an ideal out of opposition to the preservative instincts of strong life; it has depraved the reason even of the intellectually strongest natures by teaching men to feel the supreme values of intellectuality as sinful, as misleading, as temptations” (128-129). The act of surrendering one’s instincts is to become depraved, and in turn, loses moral value. If we forgo our capacity to utilize our natural instincts, our intellect, then we have made ourselves weak.

The Anti-Christ expresses a severe distaste for the lack of use of reason, the relinquishing of one’s power to think, to pull from within oneself a sense of what is, in relation to what are the confines of faith. To have faith does not make one moral, but rather requires one’s submission of what is real, natural, and intentional use of reason. The confines of faith are that one is required to repress all natural states of being and acting with oneself, and instead is attached to a system, a system where personal instincts, drive, and reason are replaced with dogmatic principles and authority. Nietzsche argues that there is no moral value in such a system.

Religion has failed to serve as a definite guarantee for morality. There is no certainty to the value of morality in relation to faith, regardless of the religion and the time, which is a problem that The Anti Christ details through the critique of Christianity, Judaism, and all organized religion. Throughout the almost systematic attack on Christianity, the terms and principles based in the religious structure are shredded and redefined as baseless, demoralizing, and harmful to all who lie in its path.

Thats Life

“Pity on the whole thwarts the law of evolution, which is the law of selection. It preserves what is ripe for destruction; it defends life’s disinherited and condemned; through the abundance of the ill-constituted of all kinds which it retains in life it gives life itself a gloomy and questionable aspect.”(pg.130)

            Nietzsche’s attitude towards a Christian notion of pity as it is related to evolution and the purpose of life can be extrapolated from the preceding passage. His language is violently inhumane in reference to any intrinsic value life might contain. He refers to some life as being “ripe for destruction”. However, if we understand his statements as a reaction his perceived effects of Christianity on society and not as a normative prescription, it becomes a bit easier to sympathize. In fact, the view he expresses is not easily denied on philosophical grounds. This is precisely the problem that theories of human rights will encounter upon attempting to create philosophical grounds for the intrinsic value of life. Nietzsche requires an evolutionary basis for the value of life. By using the word evolution, Nietzsche seems to be referring to a type of progress within society. Meanwhile, elsewhere in the text he denies the ability for man to determine the truth of a concept like progress. One problem with his strict understanding of evolution is that the preservation of life by means of pity cannot then, be considered an evolution. Furthermore determining what can and cannot be thought of as progress according to Nietzsche is impossible to do by those that the very progress effects. This would mean that by his own understanding, he is not in a position to determine that “pity thwarts the law of evolution”. This passage reeks of his concept of “uberman”. In its most superficial interpretation such a denial of the value of pity can lead to things like WWII. This is not a philosophical problem but a moral one. On the grounds that Nietzsche cannot be held responsible for the powerful implications of his philosophy it is nothing if not sound enough to enliven humanistic doubts in even the most idealistic of us. It is precisely the overcoming of such doubts that he sees as dangerous manifestations of faith. However, succumbing to the very same doubts is dangerous in it’s own right.

Post #3: Is Pessimism a Problem? –

In our reading of Twilight of the Idols, Nietzsche explains that pessimism towards life among the wise men has led them to seek the “permanent… daylight of reason” (43) for consolation, which ironically led to the “immortal unreason” (59) that perpetuates false causality. In this reading, Nietzsche touches on the issues of pessimism and skepticism, morality and nature, as wells as cause and consequence. Nietzsche critiques the Christian Church since he believes that it seeks to condemn natural life, in addition to Socrates (as a wise man) and Kant (as a moralist). However, while Nietzsche’s critique is harsh, especially against religious judgment and reason, his deconstruction leaves us with a ‘real world’ full of ‘free spirits’ following instinct. Can Nietzsche’s critique abolish the pessimism against the world, and can there ever be a world where every spirit is free from condemnation? First, I will explain the problem according to Nietzsche, and then I will explain his answer. I think that Nietzsche’s answer is lofty, but also worth giving a try.

Nietzsche believes that wise men, like Socrates, have seen the world as pessimistic. In Nietzsche’s view, the dialectic of wise men has always been that life has no meaning or value (a highly nihilistic claim). Nietzsche claims that they console themselves with unwavering rationality, even though life has shown them otherwise (that life is not entirely rational) in the apparent world. As a result, wise men have abstracted the real world by viewing the apparent world with skepticism. The Christian Church, hostile to natural life in Nietzsche’s opinion, claims that humanity’s passions are to be castrated (not moderated). The Church imposes morality that condemns the passions of life, which according to Nietzsche, condemns life itself. One of the other issues that relates to this problem (of corruptive thinking) is that of causality. Nietzsche claims that religion and morality posits consequences as causes. Consequences (like virtue) are considered to be causes (like for happiness), when really it could be that happiness (doing what one likes to do) can be the cause of virtue (living prosperously). Nietzsche implies that causes are arbitrary and are ideas developed for consolation for a pessimistic view of the ‘real world’.

But Nietzsche posits the opposite of this. He declares a future where the ‘real world’ is no longer a necessary concept (even though it also abolishes the idea of the apparent world). He claims that real morality as something instinctive and natural. Passions are not to be castrated, but moderated by a strong will. He belongs to the immoralists, who seek to affirm the world, not deny or judge it. Every particular belongs to the whole, and each should not be held accountable for existing. Nietzsche believes that by abolishing the Great Condemner, God, humanity is liberated from its guilt and is allowed to exist.

This idea is quite lofty because it implies that we can survive without authority. However, he is right that if the authority is faulty, why bother following it? Why listen to those who hate life?

Immoralists: Honour in affirming.

“We others, we immoralists, have on the contrary opened wide our hearts to every kind of understanding, comprehension, approval. We do not readily deny, we seek our honour in affirming.” (56).

In Twighlight of the Idols Nietzsche makes this very bold statement as part of his argument of morality as anti-nature. The passage is a conclusion to his arguments against Christianity and morals where he portrays them as oppressors of the “instinct of Life” (55). His affirmation of opposition and acceptance of bodily instinct and passion culminate in this statement and embody his attitude toward life.

The 'contrary' persons Nietzsche refers to in this passage are moralists who, “wanted man to be different, namely virtuous,...that of a bigot: to that end they denied the world!” (56). They are deniers in that by asking one to change themselves is to demand that the history of that person, and of the world surrounding that person. This kind of change is one which is clearly viewed as a ludicrous impossibility to Nietzsche. In demanding that change in a person, morality is not satisfied with the countless types of persons and instead demands that they ought to be different. He attributes this behavior of morality and Christianity as a, “symptom of a certain kind of life...of [a] declining, debilitated, weary, condemned life” (55) or “a denial of the will to life” (56). The position of morality to relegate the actual (or apparent) world to falsity and instead regard the 'real world' (the higher realm of the divine or rational or true) as reality “is only a suggestion of decadence” (49).

Instead, his approach to being is, “the individual is, in his future and in his past, a piece of fate, one law more, one necessity more for everything that is and everything that will be” (56). He suggests that by living according to the instincts, passions, and desires we are born with we are good and deniers of bodily instincts, “are too weak-willed, too degenerate to impose moderation upon it” (53) and are evil. Yet these 'degenerates' are needed in order for immoralists be become necessary. He calls the spiritualization of sensuality, a desire labeled as evil according to Christianity, love. And just as sensuality can be 'refined' so to speak to become spiritual, so can the concept of enmity where, “it consists in profoundly grasping the value of having enemies: in brief, in acting and thinking in the reverse of the way in which one formerly acted and thought” (53). Here immoralism becomes necessary only because it is in combat with an opposing ideology: moralism. This is in accordance with his opposition to morals in that temporality is an intrinsic characteristic of the apparent world and is denied in various fashions in the Kantian notions of the rational or even in Plato's forms. For Niietzsche, “one if fruitful only at the cost of being rich in contradictions; one remains young only on condition the soul does not relax, does not long for peace” (54). This suggests that peace is part of the immoral infinite realm which does not exists according to Nieszche. To find peace would be to cede to decadence.

When Nietzsche speaks of immoralists as open and always affirming, he speaks of people who do not deny the material reality of existence, who accept temporality in all its forms, and who embrace instinct, desire and passion. It is implied, however, that desire must be kept in check (53) for those who cannot are evil. So far Nietzsche has provided arguments refuting morality and Christianity but very little to support immorality apart from it being necessary by being the opposite of morals. This leads me to wonder if immoralists are infact promoting total chaos as Nietzsche does not provide a working definition or moderation nor does he explain a bit more on how exactly one achieve moderation in accordance with the immoralists.

The Absence of Free Will

In Nietzsche’s Twilight of Idols, particularly in his chapter “The Four Great Errors” he frequently discusses the will of man. He critiques other moral systems for their insistence in prescribing certain ways to live—certain actions to take and, more importantly, certain actions not to take (58). He locates the core problem of these philosophies in man’s confusion to identify cause and consequence—particularly in knowing what one has free will over and what one does not (58). Men are frequently told to withhold from certain instincts in these moral systems, Nietzsche thinks that stymieing these instincts is “Anti-Nature.”

The will of a man is directly relates to the amount of control he can exercise over his actions. The moral systems that prescribe the appropriate actions for man are discrediting man’s free will. Whereas, Nietzsche believes that “Everything good is instinct—and consequently easy, necessary, free” (59). In these other moral systems that Nietzsche is critiquing, he also points to the historical significance of considering man as having free will. This understanding of man’s motivation came into existence so that there was a way to discipline men for actions that were deemed punishable. Thus, men were given the notion of free will so that they can be held responsible for all that they do (64).

For Nietzsche, if “everything good is instinct” then the man who lives his life according to these instincts and acts up on them are not bad. He does not necessarily want to punish them for being motivated by these instincts. Instead, Nietzsche believes that the individual is part of a much greater whole and nothing can judge this whole because “nothing exists apart from the whole!” This is a morality which does not include man’s free will. Nietzsche claims that “’God’…[is] the greatest objection to existence.” God is the one who prevents the existence of this whole where no one man is held accountable (65).

Thus, when God is denied by man, his existence not believed, then we can deny accountability of the individual completely. Once that is accomplished, the world is redeemed (65).

Post #3: On why the knight of faith must remain paradoxical; Kierkegaard’s division of the religious and the ethical

Johannes de silentio has used the chapters in Fear and Trembling thus far to solidify essential elements of faith that must exist outside of reason. These examples lead to a reconfiguration of the concept of the universal insofar as the singular may be conceived above the universal within the realm of the absolute. The repercussions of this assertion are numerous and paradoxical to Hegelian and Kantian rational faith, and in Problem III, a final distinction is made when the knife twists a final turn and the problem of aesthetics and ethics in regards to the knight of faith. Abraham must remain a paradox or else it is impossible for him to be the father of faith. It is only through he light of faith that one may emphasize the necessity of Abraham as an essential impossible possibility.

The concept of the aesthetic here refers to an instance where an individual is put in a position where they may justify their acts against that of the universal by remaining in silence. The instances here are all justified by reasonable ends and therefore cannot be knights of faith as Abraham who must remain paradoxically above all explanations of ethical distinction in order to avoid categorization as a murderer. The ends of this silence would be to save another person in opposition of Abraham’s silence, which mustn’t be in doubt, reasoning, or any sort of lack of faith in his mission. This instance is in contradiction to the ethical by forms of revealing and hiding information or reason. The tales that de silentio weaves around the concepts of the knight of faith against the “aesthetic hero” form a solid net by which the notion of Abraham’s absurdity solidly lands. As noted in class the importance of the state of Abraham’s conscience is of utmost importance when considering his position as the pinnacle achievement of Faith. If we try to explain ourselves (or make our actions reasonable), we are reducing to the realm of language, paradoxically Abraham’s task cannot be explained through language directly because it is not reducible the dependence of shared experience on language.

Thus, the notion of language and speech has a triple-fold function within Fear and Trembling. First, Soren Kierkegaard cannot write straight from his own stance and must write under a pseudonym so as to place the work in a middle ground between lyrical tale, scripture, and philosophy. Secondly, Johannes de silentio must then as a fictitious narrator epitomize passion for the subject matter but also the impossibility of its translation into words. He must be the poet for the hero of Abraham but also explain why this cannot and need not be so. Thirdly, Abraham himself must remain silent in order for the whole work of writing to be justified, making Fear and Trembling itself a paradox within a paradox.

“…It appears that one may well understand Abraham, but only in the way that one understands the paradox. For my part, I can perhaps understand Abraham but realize as well that I do not have the courage to speak in this way, not more than I have the courage to act like Abraham; but by no means do I therefore say that it is something insignificant when on the contrary it is the only miracle.” (Page 105)

Post #2: The Concept of the Ethical

Kierkegaard asks in “Problema III” if Abraham’s concealment is ethically defensible. What does Kierkegaard mean by the ethical in this section? He describes the ethical in the beginning of this section “as such the universal; [and] as the universal it is in turn the disclosed” (p. 108 Penguin Classics). In order to understand Kierkegaard’s meaning of the ethical, one must first know what he means by the universal as well as the disclosed.

The ethical is the universal. The term “universal” relates to the putative entirety of all existing matter. The universal is a whole made up of individual parts. However, Kierkegaard is not referring to all matter in the universe when he calls the ethical that which is the universal. Instead, he claims that the universal is that which is disclosed, or in other words, revealed. The disclosed is that which is communicated and communicable. The disclosed is the opposite of what is kept secret. The undisclosed is either beyond the universal, in a religious sense as in the case of Abraham’s faith, or against it, e.g. in the form of sin, which may be considered religious as well. In either case, the undisclosed is unethical.

Thus all things that are manifest (from and among human beings) belong to the realm of the universal, where they are subject to moral code and judgment. This is basis for the universal’s ethical quality. That which is disclosed must be rational and adhere to ethical principles. In the realm of the universal in this section, the disclosed has a duty to the universal. It must be justifiable based on its telos (which must benefit the whole, i.e. the universal) and defensible by reasonable standards. The ethical applies to all parts of the whole. It applies to all members of the universal. The universal implies unconditional adherence and disclosure.

So it is seen that the ethical as Kierkegaard means it is that which is within the realm of all things manifest, subject to moral principle, and applicable to all members of the universal whole. Contrary to the ethical is that which is undisclosed, whether it is beyond or against the whole. The ethical must also be that which is rationally defensible and teleological justifiable.

The knight of faith and his paradox (Kierkegaard Problem II)

“The absolute duty may then bring one to do what ethics would forbid, but it can never make the knight of faith stop loving. Abraham demonstrates this. The moment he is willing to sacrifice Isaac, the ethical expression for what he does is this: he hates Isaac. But if he really hates Isaac, he can be sure that God does not ask it of him…” (Kierkegaard 65)

We must begin with the absolute duty and its meaning in the context in Fear and Trembling; the absolute duty for Kierkegaard (I intentionally do not use the pseudonym Johannes De Silentio) is the duty or obligation of someone to god. Now that we have established what absolute duty is we can move on to the rest of the passage; “…may then bring on to do what ethics would forbid…” (Kierkegaard 65) so now in the second part of the first sentence we have “may” encounter a possible conflict between absolute duty and ethics. In other words the absolute duty sometimes has the possibility to create an obligation that ethics would not allow. “…but it can never make the knight of faith stop loving.” So now we have this idea of the knight of faith which reappears throughout the book, the knight of faith being a god loving, and simple person. We even now have who Kierkegaard makes the knight of faith: “Abraham demonstrates this.” Abraham never stopped loving, or did he?

We now come to the section of the passage which the paradox appears, and should be emphasized. “The moment he is willing to sacrifice Isaac, the ethical expression for what he does is this: he hates Isaac.” (65) Abraham, the knight of faith, sacrifices Isaac, his only son, and his most loved possession. But according to Kierkegaard-and which one can make argument for and even against-Abraham hates Isaac because the ethical decision in killing Isaac for god assumes the conclusion that Abraham does indeed hate Isaac. In a syllogistic sense, Kierkegaard is correct, the absolute duty=sacrificing Isaac for god, but ethically it is forbidden for Abraham to kill his son, thus one can say that the conclusion of this act is that Isaac is indeed hated by his father. This is all fine up until we realize that if Abraham hates his son; god would not ask for him as Kierkegaard so boldly states: “But if he really hates Isaac, he can be sure that God does not ask it of him…” (65). (I believe it would have been better for Kierkegaard to say Abraham does not see much worth in Isaac, because the whether or not Abraham “hates” Isaac can easily be argued)

So the paradox is complete, it is an absolute duty for Abraham to sacrifice his son because god requested it; ethically it is wrong for Abraham to do so, in doing so the question of how much does Abraham truly love Isaac is manifested. So if Abraham hates Isaac why would god request Isaac from him.

(Repost from 6/28) Faithful Hero

Many would say that Abraham’s unwavering obedience to God’s horrifying command was brave; that it was a demonstration of faith at its purest. “For the one who struggled with the world became great by conquering the world, and the one who struggled with himself became greater by conquering himself, but the one who struggled with God became greater than everybody. Thus there was conflict in the world, man against man, one against a thousand, but the one who struggled with God was greater than everybody” (pg. 13). In this passage, Abraham is exalted as a hero because he chose his faith. He chose his faith above reason, above ethics, above even his own desire. In his struggle with God he won. In acting in complete compliance with God’s request, but more than that, by believing beyond reason, Abraham demonstrated the spirit of a hero. In choosing God, Abraham performed the truest form of faith.

Is faith just that, obedience? How far shall one go to act in pure faith? Is it reasonable to do what Abraham did; to follow with whole-hearted belief even when it conflicts with one’s ethics? It does appear so in Kierkegaard’s recounting of Abraham’s story. To choose faith even when it meant sacrificing the single most important thing in his life, the treasure he had waited so long to behold, the promise of a future filled with all the things he had worked for; giving this up in accordance with God’s command is what made Abraham great. God does not have to reasonable but his truest follower will act accordingly, regardless.

By giving over to God what was most precious to him, Abraham gained a closeness with God unlike anyone else. Acting in any other way would have made him less great. Abraham stands out in his struggle not only because he willed to do what God asked but because he held back all forms of doubt and question. He went steadfastly ahead as God asked, without flinching.

It brings to light the conflict of being faithful over ethical reasoning. The struggle with God is the purest form of good. To be close to God is to be good, and to be close to God, you must act in accordance with his will, without questioning or wavering. Kierkegaard’s recounting of Abraham’s story is incredibly powerful in how he describes the beauty and commitment of Abraham to grant God his request.

The Lonely Man of Faith

“The paradox can also be expressed by saying that there is an absolute duty to God, for in this relationship of duty the single individual relates himself as the single individual absolutely to the absolute.” (61)

Man’s duty to the absolute is formed by man being a single individual in a state of absolute aloneness and in isolation from the universal. The man of faith is formed by entering into a state of aloneness and becoming an absolutely single individual. The man of faith raises himself as an individual above the universal and his being is beyond the restrictions of ethics imposed by the universal.

The man who sands in relation to the universal is a reasonable and ethical man who is understood by the world. The man of faith is aware of the pleasure of being understood by the world, yet he finds the courage to live in isolation for the sake of creating an absolute duty to the absolute. The state of man as being an absolutely single individual is a state of deep inwardness which cannot be expressed to the outer universal world. Any attempt to explain himself to the world would end in failure and he would lose his status of being a single individual man of faith. The man of faith must extinguish any desire to rationalize his faith to the world. For the man of faith loneliness and isolation are the makeup of his being.

If man wanted to enter into the world of faith then man must enter alone with no partner in the experience of faith. The man of faith has no partner to comfort him; his only comfort is his absolute duty to the absolute as a single individual man of faith. As soon as the man of faith tries to find comfort and consolation with someone other than the absolute he ceases to be a man of faith. It is not possible to ask a friend take my hand and let us journey together into the world of faith. Entering into the world of faith must be done with man’s own initiation and alone. The man of faith knows the comfort of resting in the friendly abode of the universal world yet he releases the outer universal world and dwells in inner isolation.

If the man of faith cannot make himself understood by the world then the world will view him as a mad man. But the problem is that if the world cannot understand the man of faith then the world will hate him and this will lead to a conflict between the man of faith and the universal world. Is this conflict avoidable? It can be said for certain that any attempt to explain faith to the universal world would ignite the conflict. But even though the man of faith cannot make himself understood on his own terms, it might be possible for someone in the universal world to see the man of faith through his own loneliness and here the silent’s of faith through his own mind. This vision would claim admiration even from the weakest of men.

Neither a poet nor a philosopher be

How a person goes about achieving faith is an implicit question within Kierkegaard's “fear and trembling.” He explains in which ways faith cannot be achieved but does not overtly explain how to go about obtaining it. It is apparent from the preface that Kierkegaard’s approach in his writing is, in part, a reaction to Hegel’s dialectic philosophy. "I prostrate myself in deepest deference before every systematic snooper: "This is not the System, it does not have the least thing to do with the System." (6)

Hegel developed a system in which all knowledge should fit. Kierkegaard mentions that his writing is "not the system" to make the point clear that faith cannot fit within any conceivable system and so Hegel's system is not the way to go about achieving faith.

He focuses on the example of Abraham’s sacrifice of Isaac which is to be seen as the epitome of perfect faith. With this example it becomes apparent that there is a grand paradox in trying to communicate faith; faith is beyond comprehension. He offers different tales of Abraham’s journey up the mountain that were far more understandable for they were rationally explained ( Abraham pretends to enjoy killed Isaac, feeling sorrow of his deed, ect) For Abraham to be the father of faith, faith cannot be explained to us. Faith should be beyond explanation because it is about the relationship of a person to God not to other people; only God and that singular individual can understand it.

“I have devoted considerable time to understanding the Hegelian philosophy…. All this I do easily, naturally, without getting a headache form it. However when I must thing about Abraham am virtually annihilated.” (27) He says his writing is not philosophy because philosophy can be understood through writings while faith cannot.

This could be why Johannes de Silentio (his pseudonym) mentions that "the present writer is not at all a philosopher; he has not understood the System..." He refers to himself as a non-philosopher; perhaps hinting that faith cannot be found in books or expressed in words. His pseudonym Silentio translates to silent; how one goes about achieving faith is probably what Kierkegaard remains silent about through his book.

Faith - Infinity & Finitude

Whether or not faith is something achievable, seems to be the main concern throughout Kierkegaard’s writing. It doesn’t just appear in relation to himself (or Johannes de silentio) but also to all people of this (or current) age/era. Kierkegaard regards the kind of faith Abraham demonstrates not as something that comes naturally or easily, but as something of greater doing or that of something miraculous. The notion of achieving infinity and finity as aspects of the individual who could be considered as truly faithful, as Abraham was, are incorporated into Kierkegaard’s description of such an individual (if one exists). Considering the perspective of the time Kierkegaard is writing, which is not that of the biblical time of Abraham, the kind of faith and devotion that Abraham exhibits is comparably foreign in it expression. Abraham’s act of sacrificing Issac out of faith is something that Kierkegaard delves so deeply into in relation to the probability and capability of those around him to embody and express such faithfulness in its entirety.

In Fear and Trembling, Kierkegaard is unable to know or find such an individual yet imagines they would be someone ordinary, someone not immediately suspected as one holding such true intention, such true depth and purity of faith in God. The description given of such a faithful person is depicted as someone unassuming, humble, a man of routine who appreciates all that passes him by; a simpleton almost, yet he refers to him as a knight. The person who achieves faith is one who moves and lives in infinity and finitude. “He constantly makes the movement of infinity, but he does it with such precision and proficiency that he constantly gets finitude out of it and at no second does one suspect anything else” (pg. 34). Would we even know if we were being called upon to act as Abraham acted and if so, could we demonstrate unwavering faith?

This movement of infinity which Kierkegaard calls knighthood, is the state of making something into that which has no limits; a moment that can live forever because it has been resigned, in a way given up, and in doing so, preserved. The absurdity somehow accounts for its possibility, this notion of infinity because it is not limited to the finite. I think. Faith and absurdity are the aspects of the individual who moves in infinity and in finitude. Finding peace with pain is something of a movement in way of infinity. To perform what is described as “infinite movement of resignation” is a freeing of the limit (finitude) which is what our possessing of something we love puts on it. In essence, to give up that which we love, allows us somehow to keep it, always, by relinquishing the limit of our possession of it. The faith part is in doing this without negotiation, without wavering, without struggle, but to relinquish the moment, person, possession, so that it can exist in the real sense, in infinity. The tough part is that we must first part with that which we love in order to truly have it. This is absurd and at this Kierkegaard marvels.

This concept ends up being described by Kierkegaard as a paradox which he later describes the problems of this paradox of faith found in relation to the story of Abraham.

Silent Faith and Eternal Hope

In Soren Kierkegaard's Fear and Trembling, the pseudonymous writer Joannes de Silencio weaves between two methods of interpreting Abraham's trial of faith and faith itself. While grappling with the ontological paradox of the tale, he creates various characters which are used to express the feelings associated with his conceptions of the experience of faith. The poetical nature of his writing forms a loose pattern where feelings are associated with ontological concepts such as God, ethics, and infinity. In his exploration of Abraham's paradox, he addresses key emotions that give meaning to much, if not all, of humanity but excludes hope which fits snugly between the lines of this piece. Through a brief examination of Abraham's paradox and the mire of questions that spring forth from it, the implicit framework for the concept of hope is revealed.

It is made abundantly clear in Kierkegaard's Fear and Trembling that Joannes de Silencio is grappling with the paradox of Abraham. As Roy's post explains, if one obeys an absolute, universal, and infinite being, and the divine ethical code that being commands that one shall not murder (especially one's own son), then Abraham is one who's faith drove him to the precipice of committing a most grievous sin yet he is rewarded for precisely that. His faith simultaneously drives him to both obey or disobey God only to be decided which at the last moment. Joannes de Silencio encapsulates the overarching paradox as, “The ethical expression for what Abraham did is that he intended to murder Isaac; the religious expression is that he intended to sacrifice Isaac” (24). After pondering on such a statement, one is then led to extrapolate that ethics are indeed a universal; that by his faith and conviction in God to murder his son thereby breaking away from the universal code of ethics bestowed by God, he is made the absolute example of faith. Silencio addresses the issue between ethical universality and particular divine command in Problem One (46) where he writes, “Faith is exactly this paradox, that the single individual is higher than the universal, but in such a way, mind you, that the movement is repeated, so that after having been in the universal he now as the particular keeps to himself as higher than the universal” (47). He is the great exception to God's divine command through the movement of faith.

But how is Abraham's faith different than those of a ancient tales such as that of Agamemnon (50) who sacrificed his daughter, Iphigenia to appease Artemis so he could conquer Troy? In this case and similar cases de Silencio describes feelings of honor and ethics and faith working in concert for the good of society yet no miracle occurs where Iphigenia is spared at the last moment (50-51). If he had believed, his case was a trial of faith like Abraham's and opted to spare Iphigenia's life after receiving favorable winds, he would breach the universal ethics according to God, his own code of honor, his peoples honor, and his faith in upholding those ethics. In order to make the movement of absolute faith worthy of Abraham, he must first make the movement of infinite resignation where, “there is peace and rest and consolation in the pain, that is, when the movement is made properly” (38). However, even that is not enough by itself. The differentiation between a tragic hero like Agamemnon and a knight of faith is that faith also needs belief in the virtue of the absurd where, “for God everything is possible” (39). The faithful become those that are at peace and rest with every moment of the finite all the while so steadfast in their faith, that whether or not God has blessed them, they find joy and harmonious meaning in their lives through the hope that their life's wish might be realized (42).

Hope fits all the more soundly with the established notions of faith when de Silencio as himself (not as a character) writes that, “to me God's love, both in a direct and inverse sense, is incommensurable with the whole of actuality” (28) and “Faith is a miracle, and yet no human being is excluded from it, for that which unites all human life is passion, and faith is passion” (59). If love is equated with Gods presence and faith is the absolute lifelong commitment to God and faith is passion, then God is also a passion (or perhaps the passion itself) that unites all human life. Hope for the seemingly impossible or the virtue of the absurd appears to serve as the key concept in allowing the harmonious existence of love, honor, ethics, faith, the existence of God as he is in Abraham's paradox and of the paradox itself. The same troubling questions still flow from the paradox and remain unanswered but perhaps, this was one of the inferences Kierkegaard intended to be communicated through Jon the Silent. We shall see.

I’ve Got 99 Problems, but the Teleological Suspension of the Ethical Ain’t One: An Exciting Exploration of Ethics as Universal in Problem I

Kierkegaard or Johannes, whatever he’s calling himself in Problem I, makes the claim that morality is universal. Johannes writes, “the ethical as such is the universal, and as the universal it applies to everyone, which may be expressed from another angle by saying that it is in force at every moment” (46).

What an odd claim to make, right? This would seem to imply that aliens, animals, and vampires are all subjected to the same moral code as humans. But, Johannes probably has a less universal definition of “universal” in mind. He really seems to want to use the term to refer to something that is common to all persons and shared by them, and Johannes clearly believes morality is something shared by all people. This is a fair statement and it aligns nicely with idealistic moral philosophies, such as the Kantian view of morality as a universal a priori reality, or the Hegelian conception of universals (which is clearly Johannes’ target here).

However, in practice, morality seems to suffer from severe cultural relativity. This form of analysis is probably moving us further from the real meat of Johannes’ original position—a critique of Hegelian morality. The universal could be a generic, noncontroversial idea. It could refer to small groups of people with distinct moral belief structures. A group of, say, 450 persons shares a conception of morality that is considered the universal for their community. But, one person in the group—let’s call him Shmabraham—hears voices from God and, in order to prove himself to his talkative God, he must kill his son.

The 450 residents of the town in which Shmabraham lives really hate it when fathers kill their sons, or even try to, and they have created severe punishments for this kind of behavior. Herein lies the paradox of faith: either Shmabraham betrays his God or he betrays the universal conception of morality. Do we allow the individual to go outside of the universal? Is there a teleological suspension of the ethical? Clearly, people such as Johannes, Kierkegaard himself, and Muslim extremists want to say that faith trumps the universal. Furthermore, Johannes claims that it would be absurd to call Shmabraham a murderer, even though, according to Hegel, he violates “universal” morality (since faith is transcended by rational thought in Hegel’s view). Therefore, Johannes believes that religious faith is higher or at least outside of rational thought. But, how does society determine whether someone is a hero of faith or a zealot? The actual paradox seems to be, then, if we allow faith to be a viable motive in a causal world, how is society to evaluate whether an action rooted outside of the universal is tolerable each time?

Kierkegaard's Faith in Real Life

In the chapter “Preliminary Outpouring” of Fear and Trembling, Kierkegaard questions how Abraham’s actions can be justified in the eye of the general public. Can everybody follow Abraham’s steps with the thought of committing murder, and then hope to achieve joy and peace after the killing? How applicable is it?

Kierkegaard differentiates Abraham’s acts by his loyal commitment to faith. In other words, Abraham is wholeheartedly convinced that he is acting upon God’s will and that whatever happened in outcome would grant him happiness, irrespective of Isaac’s end, because of his sincere devotion to faith. If, however, faith was taken away from him, his act would simply be considered brutal and purposeless.

What one must first strive for, is infinite resignation. In the second part of the chapter, Kierkegaard focuses on infinite resignation; that is, renouncing the one most important and most meaningful desire that one believes will give rise to happiness. If one is capable of renouncing this desire to its extent, it will serve like a fortified wall shielding the spirit from any jeopardy of the finite world. Kierkegaard claims that everyone is competent enough to reach infinite resignation. By reaching this state, you eliminate the possibility of even thinking of the impossible. Instead, you are fully guided by your spirit, and thus able to attain your potential since “spiritually speaking, everything is possible” (37). In other words, once you are immersed in this state of being, you will not be deceived; this is because, by renouncing and being self-sufficient, “peace and rest” await you (38).

The next step after resigning is faith. Faith presupposes one to have already resigned and to have already achieved eternal consciousness. Yet, there is a paradox. It is supposed that to get more than eternal consciousness, faith is needed. This is where Kierkegaard introduces the concept of the absurd. He argues that by faith you will receive what you initially resigned for. “By faith Abraham did not renounce Isaac, but by faith Abraham received Isaac” (41).

Yet, the feasibility of this faith is what elicits debate amidst Kierkegaard’s argument. Kierkegaard confesses the difficulties and misunderstandings that is expected when aiming to achieve this “movement.” He often articulates the “miraculous” nature of faith, and when relating to Abraham, states, “I cannot think myself into Abraham” (27). As soon as he attempts to apply this thought process in reality, he encounters obstacles, expressing the impossible; “I can swim in life, but for this mystical floating I am too heavy” (42).

Thus, instead of attempting to mirror Abraham, Kierkegaard offers you to judge for yourself the totality of the depiction of Abraham to see if you have the courage to venture something similar.

The Concept of Faith

A knight of Faith, in Kierkegaard’s Fear and Trembling, acts without questions, or hesitation, independently from the norms and ideas of society with belief in him or herself because the actions he/she participates in is believed by the individual to be a duty set out by God.

In the story of the man and the princess, the man of infinity believes that he should be with the princess, but he gives up on her and believes that they can be together in another life or world, which is absurd on the finite plane. On the other hand the knight of faith feels almost exactly like the knight of infinity although he believes that he will be with her in his lifetime. It seems as if the knight of faith has hope in the romance even though he is not with the princess. The knight of infinity has belief in God and God alone; while the knight of faith has belief in himself and in God, which may be what faith is.

Faith is also brought up in the story of Abraham and Isaac. Abraham’s duty was to sacrifice his son, Isaac. Abraham went on to faithfully execute his duties without hesitation, without saying anything to anyone, and as he was about to sacrifice Isaac, an angel came out and rewarded Abraham with his son back.

This story is a paradox: if killing is a sin, which was even made into a commandment, then why would Abraham follow the voice of God, who told him to kill his son? This is a question of doubt, and in doubt there is no faith. In the story Abraham did not question himself, and he didn’t even reach out to anybody else with what to do in this absurd predicament. Abraham faithfully followed what he had been told to do, and absurdly (rationally impossibly) he was rewarded his son back thanks to an angel. Whether this story is a poetic metaphor for Abraham believing that he still has his son in imagination land, or whether he became conscious of what he was doing and didn’t kill his son because of an angel he may have seen; Abraham was still willing to fulfill his duty.

The concept of faith, according to Kierkegaard is a paradox because firstly the man/woman has to believe in infinite resignation, which is the strength to give up everything finite; but at the same time believe that the impossible is possible. It seems as if faith is another word for hope. Although in the story of Abraham and the man it seems as if Faith is also confidence in oneself.

Whatever faith may be, it seems to shares the following qualities:

1) Indifference to the norms and ideas of society

2) Belief in God

3) Belief in oneself

4) The ability to give every finite noun up

5) The confidence/ability/courage to take action

Issac needs a better Gaard: An entry of conceptual co-dependency and impracticality

In these first looks at Kierkegaard’s Fear and Trembling, valid investigation lies within the contingent yet necessarily differential nature of relationships between rationality and faith.

Johannes de silentio’s most religiously neutral example is between the role of the hero and the poet. This relationship is direct but also hierarchical; poet’s skills are useless without those of the hero to actualize the record and the hero’s fame robbed of immortality without any way to reminisce them. Memories serve as a way for heroic acts to become examples attainable greatness and a way to maintain an exemplary template to measure those deeds upon forthcoming generations. Through their sustainability, these acts become ideals or an activation of understanding. If faith is the talk at hand, the implementation of an ideal comes with the New Testament with Jesus Christ. However, Johannes de silentio remains in the Old Testament for his example of faith in God because for initially two clear reasons. Firstly, that the Old Testament is an example of ideals transcending text into reasons for action metaphorically, and secondly, that it is precisely to act that is important to his key example, the faith physically within the biblical patriarch Abraham.

Johannes gives multiple scenarios of instances where Abraham’s faith in God could have been altered by doubt motivated by reason. We rely on Johannes de silentio to preserve the necessity for faith-based philosophy that is dependant on the scripture recounting Abraham’s deeds. Furthermore, the legitimacy of such and its permeability through time is dependant on Abraham’s initial sincerity of faith (and lack of rationality) as simultaneously the roots of Christian civilization. This epic flow of events whittles down to the spark: the perseverance of God to have always fulfilled that faith.

Kierkegaard has become a figurehead for both his role in the existentialist movement and his specifically faith based philosophy -- two fields dependant on a search for meaning. While the attempt to relieve human kind of the dogmatic nature of Christian doctrine initiated a wave of at times nihilistic doubt, Kierkegaard’s need for passion re-implements grounds for fanaticism averted Kantian reason. We rely, through Johanne’s recount, precisely that – recounted revealed reasons to spur forth a faith within us that harks of a priori reason insofar as it is motivating us before we are to know instances in which it is to show itself.

Despite the disheartening and at times seemingly futile effort of finding a base in reasoning (as in Kant), without striving for a type of absolute knowledge through reason our the time of this text, of the Hegelian system and the Kierkegaardian faith, by allowing elements of passion and feeling to become forces bound on a quest to meaning that dilute their sustainability with motivation by weaker sources. The classic battle of faith against reason within Pascal’s wager seems like the closest middle ground between faith and reason, a mediation that remains as disheartening as any Kantian argument.

Dose the world vanish in God's unity?

“God is a thinking being; but the objects that he thinks and comprehends are, like his mind, not distinguished form his being. Thus, in thinking the objects, he thinks only himself, namely, he remains in an unbroken unity with himself.”

In this passage Feuerbach expresses the idea that God thinking is not thinking of objects which are outside of God. Unlike human beings who’s thought is only possible when there are objects outside of the self (subject), with Gods thought there is no distinction between subject (God) and object . God thinking of objects is thinking of objects as they are God. But how can this idea be sated as a coherent thought, it seams that this idea can lead to the world being God. According to this passage, God can only think of himself but not of anything outside of God. Now suppose God thinks of the world it seams the only way this is possible is if the world is God himself (nature or God).

Furthermore, in this passage it is implied that God is essentially thought, reason or intellect. But if God is viewed as the intellect this can be a problem for the notion of the unity of God. The concepts of intellect and understanding can only bed applied to an object which can be broken and divided in to components. We do not understand objects as holistic beings, rather, we analyze and comprehend parts and components of objects. If God is thought or intellect then there would be the possibility of braking apart and dividing God in to components. This would be an absurdity and a contradiction to the unity of God.

Class is cancelled today, see you Tuesday

Kierkegaard & Faith

In the Preface of Kierkegaard’s Fear and Trembling his character, Johannes de silentio critiques the modern attitude towards doubt and faith which is reached, he believes, in a way that is much too simple. He compares the modern man’s ability to reach doubt and faith to Descartes’ doubt or those of even older philosophers who reached doubt with intense questioning and logical processes. Faith is now also considered something easily attainable, a default of nearly every individual whereas it was once considered something much more challenging to obtain.

In the next section of our reading, “Tuning Up,” Johannes discusses various ways in which the story of Abraham and his son Isaac could be rendered. The true story where Isaac is murdered by his father, is an example of perfect faith in God. The retellings that are outlined here do not help anyone to understand Abraham’s actions because, if I understand Johannes meaning, Abraham’s faith is not something that we should try or can understand. These retellings don’t lead the man who is thinking of them anywhere and we will be equally as lost in attempting to make sense of them. One can only understand Abraham’s actions if one understands faith wholly.

Johannes discusses in the following section, “A Tribute to Abraham,” what makes a great man which he claims is determined by a man’s love, expectation, and struggle. The greatest of men will be those who love God, expect the impossible, and struggle with God. Abraham was of the greatest men because he felt these three things, because his faith in god was so unwavering and unconditional. Johannes continues to express Abraham’s greatness by telling his life story and how all of his brave actions by faith.

Heading into the reading ahead, we know 4 things about faith as it is defined and presented in Fear and Trembling:

1. Its opposite is doubt

2. It is not something that we can understand or obtain easily

3. Faith is a requirement for the religious man

4. And it is a requirement for the greatest of men to live by it