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Tuesday, July 5, 2011

I’ve Got 99 Problems, but the Teleological Suspension of the Ethical Ain’t One: An Exciting Exploration of Ethics as Universal in Problem I


Kierkegaard or Johannes, whatever he’s calling himself in Problem I, makes the claim that morality is universal. Johannes writes, “the ethical as such is the universal, and as the universal it applies to everyone, which may be expressed from another angle by saying that it is in force at every moment” (46).

What an odd claim to make, right? This would seem to imply that aliens, animals, and vampires are all subjected to the same moral code as humans. But, Johannes probably has a less universal definition of “universal” in mind. He really seems to want to use the term to refer to something that is common to all persons and shared by them, and Johannes clearly believes morality is something shared by all people. This is a fair statement and it aligns nicely with idealistic moral philosophies, such as the Kantian view of morality as a universal a priori reality, or the Hegelian conception of universals (which is clearly Johannes’ target here).

However, in practice, morality seems to suffer from severe cultural relativity. This form of analysis is probably moving us further from the real meat of Johannes’ original position—a critique of Hegelian morality. The universal could be a generic, noncontroversial idea. It could refer to small groups of people with distinct moral belief structures. A group of, say, 450 persons shares a conception of morality that is considered the universal for their community. But, one person in the group—let’s call him Shmabraham—hears voices from God and, in order to prove himself to his talkative God, he must kill his son.

The 450 residents of the town in which Shmabraham lives really hate it when fathers kill their sons, or even try to, and they have created severe punishments for this kind of behavior. Herein lies the paradox of faith: either Shmabraham betrays his God or he betrays the universal conception of morality. Do we allow the individual to go outside of the universal? Is there a teleological suspension of the ethical? Clearly, people such as Johannes, Kierkegaard himself, and Muslim extremists want to say that faith trumps the universal. Furthermore, Johannes claims that it would be absurd to call Shmabraham a murderer, even though, according to Hegel, he violates “universal” morality (since faith is transcended by rational thought in Hegel’s view). Therefore, Johannes believes that religious faith is higher or at least outside of rational thought. But, how does society determine whether someone is a hero of faith or a zealot? The actual paradox seems to be, then, if we allow faith to be a viable motive in a causal world, how is society to evaluate whether an action rooted outside of the universal is tolerable each time?

7 comments:

  1. It almost seems as if everybody cannot be fully faithful in the casual world, otherwise criminals may say that their crimes were committed to remain faithful to God; and if that occurred it is highly unlikely for the society to believe the individual.

    example - http://www.oregonlive.com/pacific-northwest-news/index.ssf/2011/06/seattle_man_charged_in_brutal_rape_and_stabbing_of_lesbian_couple_says_god_told_him_to_do_it.html

    According to Thomas Paine "Government, even in its best state, is but a necessary evil; in its worst state, an intolerable one." As far as the United States is concerned, society can evaluate whether an action is tolerable or not through the judicial system. On the flip side for other counties, it seems as if rather barbaric actions are carried out simply because the people have the power to do what they want to do. Which leads me to ponder about: 1) a nation ruled by people who have the power do anything, or 2) a nation of actual religious faith. Is power more focused on than faith?

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  2. What is faith in this scenario, really? It seems like it offers people who have "access" to some higher power an opportunity to act outside of common morality. I grant you that morality is often violated by the very government meant to enforce it, and this is often done without any appeals to abstract faith. But, faith is still used to justify a multitude of atrocities by groups and individuals alike. Had Abraham killed Isaac would he be looked at as the father of faith, really? Or would he be something far more sinister? Either way, my opinion is that there is no paradox here. Hegel would be right in having to say that Abraham is a murderer.

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  3. "Johannes believes that religious faith is higher or at least outside of rational thought." I keep questioning this while I'm reading. Does he really think that faith is above or outside of rationality or is following faith rational? According to Johannes. Or Kierkegaard. My confusion regarding this seems clouded even more by the difficulty in identifying Johannes' opinion and then Kierkegaard's.

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  4. What is also very contradictory in this segment is that Johannes makes it hard to even act loyal to faith, to be faithful, by requiring the silence to follow. That is, a faithful human is supposed to keep silent and not justify his/her actions about the motives. Thus, an outsider is incapable of knowing the reasons behind one's motivation of certain actions that faith can evoke.

    This silence that is kept throughout can make it extremely difficult to judge an action according to morality. In the case of 2) a nation of actual religious faith, how are we going to know who's actions are barbaric and who's are faithful, if all the faithful ones keep silent?

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  5. "Therefore, Johannes believes that religious faith is higher or at least outside of rational thought". I sensed that Johannes held rational thought not to be the universal but God instead. Weather God is a rational being or not is unclear. If true faith is outside of God it would have to transcend God. But how can this be when faith is devotion to God's will and not anything more? Maybe I missed a line that makes God a purely rational being but this is why the paradox exists to me.

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  6. t.parekh

    I was thinking about how difficult it would be to differentiate who is faithful and who is a lunatic in the world as well. It made me think of that famous antitheist quote by Steven Weinberg

    " With or without it religion, you'd have good people doing good things and evil people doing bad things, but for good people to do bad things, it takes religion.”

    When thinking about this issue the passage where Kierkegaard says "in the external world everything belongs to the possessor ...and whoever has the world's treasures has them no matter how he got them. In the world of the spirit it is otherwise, it holds true that only the one who works gets the bread" (21)

    To me this meant that my questions of application of Kierkegaard's faith within society is irrelevant, it is the wrong question to be asking.

    If Abraham was convicted of attempted murder in this society I think Kierkegaard might accept this since the external world "toils slavishly under the law of indifference." Any benefits of faith cannot operate in the external world only in the spiritual.

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  7. In reference to your last post Tejas; you bring up a few interesting points and also helped develope a few of my own. Ultimately do you believe (what your trying to say, and correct me if I am wrong) that Kierkegaard would excuse any act in the external world if it was truly for the spiritual world? I was also thinking about what you said and what is Kierkegaard really saying, to me it seems that he is only pointing out-or rather-rephrasing one of religion's main ideas, that the external world has a lesser meaning then that of the spirtual. Any thought on these ideas or anything that might help me understand a more accuarate goal of Kierkegaards would be great.

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