“By propensity (propensio) I understand the subjective ground of the possibility of an inclination (habitual desire, concupiscientia), insofar as this possibility is contingent for humanity in general.” (29—this corresponds to the marginal pagination, but the translation may be slightly different because I’ve had to use my Cambridge edition of the Religion book, as even my Hackett copy hasn’t arrived yet).This reading is on evil, and here Kant is describing the ground or basis of that evil.
In the passage Kant does not mention evil, although he does speak of an “inclination”, and the latter refers to aspects of human action separate from the duties constitutive of moral goodness. Inclination generally refers to the bodily or worldly appetites or desires that emerge from experience and that direct an individual’s action. Any desire for something is by its nature teleological, and therefore inadequate for moral goodness, insofar as Kant identifies the latter with the maxims or rules that direct one’s conduct (not the ends that might direct one’s conduct).
This propensity is necessary in order to explain evil. For evil must result from the power of choice, by which Kant means something different from the types of choices I make everyday. This choice is much deeper and governing than the choices I make, say, for the Cobb salad rather than an omelet. For this choice is the determination of a rule that in turn shapes my conduct.
Briefly, Kant thinks that our actions may be either subjectively or objectively grounded. To be objectively grounded, a purely rational rule—the “moral law”—has been established. This ground is objective because it is dependent upon reason and is also universal and necessary. It is not objective because it is based on the ‘real’ external world, as we are wont to say. If our actions are subjectively grounded, then our desires or appetites have become the rule governing them. This ground is subjective because it comes from our person (in a non-Kantian sense, cf. 27-28), but is not purely rationally determined.
Now why does he speak of the “possibility” of an inclination, especially since this will turn out to be one descriptive of all humanity? Would it not be more accurate to say the “necessity” of an inclination? No, because this inclination is something chosen, and is in this respect a possibility. When Kant says that this possibility is contingent, this seems equally confusing. However, I think that Kant might respond that the predisposition to moral goodness is a necessary possibility, rather than a contingent one, insofar as the rationality of the human being is the basis for that moral goodness. In that respect, human beings are “innately” morally good. Yet, despite this, they do evil acts, and that is because, [1] they must have some force leading them to act morally beyond merely the incentive of the respect for the moral law (27), and [2] that force is the choice a person makes overcoming his propensity to evil, which is equally an act of choice.
For Kant, it seems to me, moral acts fall into one of four different categories:
ReplyDelete1.If a person performs an act solely because it conforms to the moral law, then Kant would say that the person and the act should be commended.
2.If a person performs an act that conforms to the moral law, but their motivations are different than a strict adherence to moral law, then Kant would say that the act is moral but the person is not.
3.If a person acts knowingly in opposition to the moral law, then the act and the person are immoral.
4.If the person acts according to false maxims, then the person is to be praised but the act is not.
I have a question regarding what you said, Sean. In number four, "if the person acts according to false maxims, then the person is to be praised but the act is not." Why would the person in this situation be praised? According to Kant, the act does not have any moral worth (thus, it is not to be praised, as Sean said). So if an action has no moral worth, how can the individual have moral worth? If you are acting according to a false maxim, does that imply that you are not being rational? Perhaps, you are right Sea, but I'm just not following why a person acting according to a false maxim should be praised.
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ReplyDeleteI want to dig deeper on Kants thoughts on how actions can be either subjectively or objectively grounded. When a person thinks objectively/rationally he/she is focused on a certain topic, for example philosophy. However, at the same time there are still things going on in the body and emotions which are still there. It is the humans choice whether to: 1) ignore those emotions, 2) accept them and remain non-reactive and continue with rational thought, or 3) go with the emotion. If a human being decides to feed these emotions and fall into an emotional state, then he/she is more likely to act "evil", and make poor choices according to theology.
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ReplyDeleteKant's distinction between the contingency of inclination and the necessary possibility of moral goodness poses a bit of a problem for me, especially when he allows animalistic inclinations to not necessarily be evil. As stated in class, Kant doesn't seem to have a problem with animalistic tendencies such as procreation. Yet wouldn't these actions be part of the subjective ground since the actions are geared towards attaining an end i.e. children? If so, why shouldn't propensities also be a necessary possibility? Just as innate human reason is the basis for moral goodness, innate animalistic propensities could be the basis for moral evil.
ReplyDeleteTo Hanna: I think your critique is fair and accurate. I definitely should not have used a strong word like "praised." Instead, something like "approve" is probably appropriate. Perhaps Kant would "approve" of a person who is trying to live a life of duty according to maxims even if their reason fails them and they adhere to a non-universal maxim. I think my original use of the word "false" was too strong and maybe "incorrect" seems less sinister. Overall, I may be incorrect in my characterization, but it seems to me that Kant leaves a lot of room for the moral agent to have errors in judgment, since only the Christ figure is a morally perfect model after all, and still the agent would be a moral person if they try to live a dutiful life. I think my original statement left itself open to an interpretation where somehow a murderer could be praised morally. Clearly, Kant wouldn't say that under any circumstance.
ReplyDeleteI was wondering if someone could explain to me what Kant means when he uses the word "rationality." I think we said in class that it should be thought of as something outside the individual as opposed to within the mind, however, I am having trouble conceptualizing this.
ReplyDeleteAlso, how do you think Kant would respond to physical anthropologist and animal behaviorist's discoveries of reason in animals. (example: Jane Goodall's chimps. Kanzi, Koko.)
These discoveries make reason seem like a difference of quality not kind which is a viewpoint Kant would oppose.
To lexiey:
ReplyDeleteI think Kant's rationality is using the relation to the world, remaining objective, to understand the world. Rationality takes place "within the mind" as well, but it is considers factors outside of the self. It is the putative opposite to emotional and empirical influence. It is detached from aesthetic experience. It is the use of logic and reason, classification and category. It is the scientific approach to life, instead of the existential.
I hope that helps.