The Absence of Free Will

In Nietzsche’s Twilight of Idols, particularly in his chapter “The Four Great Errors” he frequently discusses the will of man. He critiques other moral systems for their insistence in prescribing certain ways to live—certain actions to take and, more importantly, certain actions not to take (58). He locates the core problem of these philosophies in man’s confusion to identify cause and consequence—particularly in knowing what one has free will over and what one does not (58). Men are frequently told to withhold from certain instincts in these moral systems, Nietzsche thinks that stymieing these instincts is “Anti-Nature.”

The will of a man is directly relates to the amount of control he can exercise over his actions. The moral systems that prescribe the appropriate actions for man are discrediting man’s free will. Whereas, Nietzsche believes that “Everything good is instinct—and consequently easy, necessary, free” (59). In these other moral systems that Nietzsche is critiquing, he also points to the historical significance of considering man as having free will. This understanding of man’s motivation came into existence so that there was a way to discipline men for actions that were deemed punishable. Thus, men were given the notion of free will so that they can be held responsible for all that they do (64).

For Nietzsche, if “everything good is instinct” then the man who lives his life according to these instincts and acts up on them are not bad. He does not necessarily want to punish them for being motivated by these instincts. Instead, Nietzsche believes that the individual is part of a much greater whole and nothing can judge this whole because “nothing exists apart from the whole!” This is a morality which does not include man’s free will. Nietzsche claims that “’God’…[is] the greatest objection to existence.” God is the one who prevents the existence of this whole where no one man is held accountable (65).

Thus, when God is denied by man, his existence not believed, then we can deny accountability of the individual completely. Once that is accomplished, the world is redeemed (65).

Post #3: On why the knight of faith must remain paradoxical; Kierkegaard’s division of the religious and the ethical

Johannes de silentio has used the chapters in Fear and Trembling thus far to solidify essential elements of faith that must exist outside of reason. These examples lead to a reconfiguration of the concept of the universal insofar as the singular may be conceived above the universal within the realm of the absolute. The repercussions of this assertion are numerous and paradoxical to Hegelian and Kantian rational faith, and in Problem III, a final distinction is made when the knife twists a final turn and the problem of aesthetics and ethics in regards to the knight of faith. Abraham must remain a paradox or else it is impossible for him to be the father of faith. It is only through he light of faith that one may emphasize the necessity of Abraham as an essential impossible possibility.

The concept of the aesthetic here refers to an instance where an individual is put in a position where they may justify their acts against that of the universal by remaining in silence. The instances here are all justified by reasonable ends and therefore cannot be knights of faith as Abraham who must remain paradoxically above all explanations of ethical distinction in order to avoid categorization as a murderer. The ends of this silence would be to save another person in opposition of Abraham’s silence, which mustn’t be in doubt, reasoning, or any sort of lack of faith in his mission. This instance is in contradiction to the ethical by forms of revealing and hiding information or reason. The tales that de silentio weaves around the concepts of the knight of faith against the “aesthetic hero” form a solid net by which the notion of Abraham’s absurdity solidly lands. As noted in class the importance of the state of Abraham’s conscience is of utmost importance when considering his position as the pinnacle achievement of Faith. If we try to explain ourselves (or make our actions reasonable), we are reducing to the realm of language, paradoxically Abraham’s task cannot be explained through language directly because it is not reducible the dependence of shared experience on language.

Thus, the notion of language and speech has a triple-fold function within Fear and Trembling. First, Soren Kierkegaard cannot write straight from his own stance and must write under a pseudonym so as to place the work in a middle ground between lyrical tale, scripture, and philosophy. Secondly, Johannes de silentio must then as a fictitious narrator epitomize passion for the subject matter but also the impossibility of its translation into words. He must be the poet for the hero of Abraham but also explain why this cannot and need not be so. Thirdly, Abraham himself must remain silent in order for the whole work of writing to be justified, making Fear and Trembling itself a paradox within a paradox.

“…It appears that one may well understand Abraham, but only in the way that one understands the paradox. For my part, I can perhaps understand Abraham but realize as well that I do not have the courage to speak in this way, not more than I have the courage to act like Abraham; but by no means do I therefore say that it is something insignificant when on the contrary it is the only miracle.” (Page 105)

Post #2: The Concept of the Ethical

Kierkegaard asks in “Problema III” if Abraham’s concealment is ethically defensible. What does Kierkegaard mean by the ethical in this section? He describes the ethical in the beginning of this section “as such the universal; [and] as the universal it is in turn the disclosed” (p. 108 Penguin Classics). In order to understand Kierkegaard’s meaning of the ethical, one must first know what he means by the universal as well as the disclosed.

The ethical is the universal. The term “universal” relates to the putative entirety of all existing matter. The universal is a whole made up of individual parts. However, Kierkegaard is not referring to all matter in the universe when he calls the ethical that which is the universal. Instead, he claims that the universal is that which is disclosed, or in other words, revealed. The disclosed is that which is communicated and communicable. The disclosed is the opposite of what is kept secret. The undisclosed is either beyond the universal, in a religious sense as in the case of Abraham’s faith, or against it, e.g. in the form of sin, which may be considered religious as well. In either case, the undisclosed is unethical.

Thus all things that are manifest (from and among human beings) belong to the realm of the universal, where they are subject to moral code and judgment. This is basis for the universal’s ethical quality. That which is disclosed must be rational and adhere to ethical principles. In the realm of the universal in this section, the disclosed has a duty to the universal. It must be justifiable based on its telos (which must benefit the whole, i.e. the universal) and defensible by reasonable standards. The ethical applies to all parts of the whole. It applies to all members of the universal. The universal implies unconditional adherence and disclosure.

So it is seen that the ethical as Kierkegaard means it is that which is within the realm of all things manifest, subject to moral principle, and applicable to all members of the universal whole. Contrary to the ethical is that which is undisclosed, whether it is beyond or against the whole. The ethical must also be that which is rationally defensible and teleological justifiable.

The knight of faith and his paradox (Kierkegaard Problem II)

“The absolute duty may then bring one to do what ethics would forbid, but it can never make the knight of faith stop loving. Abraham demonstrates this. The moment he is willing to sacrifice Isaac, the ethical expression for what he does is this: he hates Isaac. But if he really hates Isaac, he can be sure that God does not ask it of him…” (Kierkegaard 65)

We must begin with the absolute duty and its meaning in the context in Fear and Trembling; the absolute duty for Kierkegaard (I intentionally do not use the pseudonym Johannes De Silentio) is the duty or obligation of someone to god. Now that we have established what absolute duty is we can move on to the rest of the passage; “…may then bring on to do what ethics would forbid…” (Kierkegaard 65) so now in the second part of the first sentence we have “may” encounter a possible conflict between absolute duty and ethics. In other words the absolute duty sometimes has the possibility to create an obligation that ethics would not allow. “…but it can never make the knight of faith stop loving.” So now we have this idea of the knight of faith which reappears throughout the book, the knight of faith being a god loving, and simple person. We even now have who Kierkegaard makes the knight of faith: “Abraham demonstrates this.” Abraham never stopped loving, or did he?

We now come to the section of the passage which the paradox appears, and should be emphasized. “The moment he is willing to sacrifice Isaac, the ethical expression for what he does is this: he hates Isaac.” (65) Abraham, the knight of faith, sacrifices Isaac, his only son, and his most loved possession. But according to Kierkegaard-and which one can make argument for and even against-Abraham hates Isaac because the ethical decision in killing Isaac for god assumes the conclusion that Abraham does indeed hate Isaac. In a syllogistic sense, Kierkegaard is correct, the absolute duty=sacrificing Isaac for god, but ethically it is forbidden for Abraham to kill his son, thus one can say that the conclusion of this act is that Isaac is indeed hated by his father. This is all fine up until we realize that if Abraham hates his son; god would not ask for him as Kierkegaard so boldly states: “But if he really hates Isaac, he can be sure that God does not ask it of him…” (65). (I believe it would have been better for Kierkegaard to say Abraham does not see much worth in Isaac, because the whether or not Abraham “hates” Isaac can easily be argued)

So the paradox is complete, it is an absolute duty for Abraham to sacrifice his son because god requested it; ethically it is wrong for Abraham to do so, in doing so the question of how much does Abraham truly love Isaac is manifested. So if Abraham hates Isaac why would god request Isaac from him.

(Repost from 6/28) Faithful Hero

Many would say that Abraham’s unwavering obedience to God’s horrifying command was brave; that it was a demonstration of faith at its purest. “For the one who struggled with the world became great by conquering the world, and the one who struggled with himself became greater by conquering himself, but the one who struggled with God became greater than everybody. Thus there was conflict in the world, man against man, one against a thousand, but the one who struggled with God was greater than everybody” (pg. 13). In this passage, Abraham is exalted as a hero because he chose his faith. He chose his faith above reason, above ethics, above even his own desire. In his struggle with God he won. In acting in complete compliance with God’s request, but more than that, by believing beyond reason, Abraham demonstrated the spirit of a hero. In choosing God, Abraham performed the truest form of faith.

Is faith just that, obedience? How far shall one go to act in pure faith? Is it reasonable to do what Abraham did; to follow with whole-hearted belief even when it conflicts with one’s ethics? It does appear so in Kierkegaard’s recounting of Abraham’s story. To choose faith even when it meant sacrificing the single most important thing in his life, the treasure he had waited so long to behold, the promise of a future filled with all the things he had worked for; giving this up in accordance with God’s command is what made Abraham great. God does not have to reasonable but his truest follower will act accordingly, regardless.

By giving over to God what was most precious to him, Abraham gained a closeness with God unlike anyone else. Acting in any other way would have made him less great. Abraham stands out in his struggle not only because he willed to do what God asked but because he held back all forms of doubt and question. He went steadfastly ahead as God asked, without flinching.

It brings to light the conflict of being faithful over ethical reasoning. The struggle with God is the purest form of good. To be close to God is to be good, and to be close to God, you must act in accordance with his will, without questioning or wavering. Kierkegaard’s recounting of Abraham’s story is incredibly powerful in how he describes the beauty and commitment of Abraham to grant God his request.

The Lonely Man of Faith

“The paradox can also be expressed by saying that there is an absolute duty to God, for in this relationship of duty the single individual relates himself as the single individual absolutely to the absolute.” (61)

Man’s duty to the absolute is formed by man being a single individual in a state of absolute aloneness and in isolation from the universal. The man of faith is formed by entering into a state of aloneness and becoming an absolutely single individual. The man of faith raises himself as an individual above the universal and his being is beyond the restrictions of ethics imposed by the universal.

The man who sands in relation to the universal is a reasonable and ethical man who is understood by the world. The man of faith is aware of the pleasure of being understood by the world, yet he finds the courage to live in isolation for the sake of creating an absolute duty to the absolute. The state of man as being an absolutely single individual is a state of deep inwardness which cannot be expressed to the outer universal world. Any attempt to explain himself to the world would end in failure and he would lose his status of being a single individual man of faith. The man of faith must extinguish any desire to rationalize his faith to the world. For the man of faith loneliness and isolation are the makeup of his being.

If man wanted to enter into the world of faith then man must enter alone with no partner in the experience of faith. The man of faith has no partner to comfort him; his only comfort is his absolute duty to the absolute as a single individual man of faith. As soon as the man of faith tries to find comfort and consolation with someone other than the absolute he ceases to be a man of faith. It is not possible to ask a friend take my hand and let us journey together into the world of faith. Entering into the world of faith must be done with man’s own initiation and alone. The man of faith knows the comfort of resting in the friendly abode of the universal world yet he releases the outer universal world and dwells in inner isolation.

If the man of faith cannot make himself understood by the world then the world will view him as a mad man. But the problem is that if the world cannot understand the man of faith then the world will hate him and this will lead to a conflict between the man of faith and the universal world. Is this conflict avoidable? It can be said for certain that any attempt to explain faith to the universal world would ignite the conflict. But even though the man of faith cannot make himself understood on his own terms, it might be possible for someone in the universal world to see the man of faith through his own loneliness and here the silent’s of faith through his own mind. This vision would claim admiration even from the weakest of men.

Neither a poet nor a philosopher be

How a person goes about achieving faith is an implicit question within Kierkegaard's “fear and trembling.” He explains in which ways faith cannot be achieved but does not overtly explain how to go about obtaining it. It is apparent from the preface that Kierkegaard’s approach in his writing is, in part, a reaction to Hegel’s dialectic philosophy. "I prostrate myself in deepest deference before every systematic snooper: "This is not the System, it does not have the least thing to do with the System." (6)

Hegel developed a system in which all knowledge should fit. Kierkegaard mentions that his writing is "not the system" to make the point clear that faith cannot fit within any conceivable system and so Hegel's system is not the way to go about achieving faith.

He focuses on the example of Abraham’s sacrifice of Isaac which is to be seen as the epitome of perfect faith. With this example it becomes apparent that there is a grand paradox in trying to communicate faith; faith is beyond comprehension. He offers different tales of Abraham’s journey up the mountain that were far more understandable for they were rationally explained ( Abraham pretends to enjoy killed Isaac, feeling sorrow of his deed, ect) For Abraham to be the father of faith, faith cannot be explained to us. Faith should be beyond explanation because it is about the relationship of a person to God not to other people; only God and that singular individual can understand it.

“I have devoted considerable time to understanding the Hegelian philosophy…. All this I do easily, naturally, without getting a headache form it. However when I must thing about Abraham am virtually annihilated.” (27) He says his writing is not philosophy because philosophy can be understood through writings while faith cannot.

This could be why Johannes de Silentio (his pseudonym) mentions that "the present writer is not at all a philosopher; he has not understood the System..." He refers to himself as a non-philosopher; perhaps hinting that faith cannot be found in books or expressed in words. His pseudonym Silentio translates to silent; how one goes about achieving faith is probably what Kierkegaard remains silent about through his book.