Good God

In his “Third Piece” Kant further substantiates his account of “the good” with his understanding of the relationship between the circumstances under which it might flourish and the role that it plays in creating such circumstances as a reciprocal one. Without making any direct metaphysical claim about the existence of the good outside of society he concedes that neither the role of the idea of goodness nor ethical societies are attainable or “apprehended through mature deliberation”(136) outside of human society. The church is presented as one manifestation of the human effort towards a god-pleasing morality. For Kant the role of scripture and religion is precisely to allow that an infinite maxim such as goodness exist in order that humanity might have a uniting idea to aspire to. Just as ethical communities will inevitably still fall short of their ideals different faiths in will fall short of the “one true religion” (118). Precisely in their variances is where we might find their shortcomings however it seems to be the case that like the “good” that finite beings are doomed to ever struggle to attain, the “one true religion” is also an impossibility. Nevertheless Kant is optimistic in his outlook for inevitable progress of human kind. The ultimate role of the notion of goodness is as a unifying ideal that leads, “unnoticed by human eyes” to a “world of an eternal peace”. (137) Goodness is then understood as a function of religion, more specifically, that which pleases god. He expounds upon such a definition of the good noting that one way in which human beings can please god is to act morally towards each other.

Initially it would seem that human access to the notion of the good cannot be arrived at through pure reason but rather needs “scripture” and “tradition”. Instead Kant will understand the rational concept of the good to be essentially the same as the “true religion” conception of it. The two understandings are different paths to a single idea.

The problem with such an effort to reconcile the religious perspective of the good with a faithless concept of morality is that it is rational in itself. Kant’s argument asks the faithless to concede that rationality itself is a true ideal.

Ratioal or Revealed Religion

We concluded our last class with Professor Vaught insisting on a distinction between rational religion and revealed religion. Besides the theoretical distinction, what is the actual difference practically between these two notions? Rational religion is understood to mean a set of conclusions which is arrived at through reason. Given principles about man the world and the history of humanity Kant investigates the consequences of these principles. This use of reason is essentially what yields to notions like the universal moral imperative and radical evil. Now in revealed religion these same notions are received through revelation. It seems possible that these two approaches to religion can yield the same notions and principles. What then is the actual difference between them?

Full moral perfection

“That which alone can make a world the object of divine decree and the end of creation is Humanity (rational being in general as pertaining to the world) in its full moral perfection, from which happiness follows in the will of the Highest Being directly as from its supreme condition” (61 Marginal pagination)

This reading of Kant speaks of the prototype figure that is the son of God, the human being well-pleasing to God. Although it is clear that humans in the natural world cannot inherit the features of this prototype supreme being, is it possible for individuals to resemble the perfect morality of this supreme being by being willing to “execute in person all human’duties” (61) and spread the goodness all around the world?

This passage alludes to words such as “supreme” and “full moral perfection,” concepts that suggest the ideal, but which are not not typical of the human race. In this reading, Kant describes what a perfect human being would look like for God. This mortal being that he describes is not just any ordinary person but, “the idea of him proceeds from God’s being” and is God’s “only-begotten Son” (61/80 Cambridge edition). In other words, he is a prototype of a human with perfect moral disposition. Kant states that because humans are evil by nature, the idea of them embodying a similar model for the utmost “good,” without some sort of influence, is unlikely.

Thus, according to Kant, one must embody this prototype as if it was a duty as humans to live by and resemble this ideal of moral perfection. Yet, Kant denies the fact that the human being will ever attain this state. He says that even if there existed a being that could exhibit “the example of a human being well-pleasing to God” (63), he would be considered supernatural. Also, how could it be that this particular being, who possesses the same needs, the same inclinations, and sufferings as any other ordinary human, be so different from any other? Instead of ameliorating the situation regarding moral perfection, he would “stand in the way” (63) and be reducing the possibilities for others to mirror this image. This supernatural being, who has not gained his good qualities but who has inherited them from heaven, is too unbalanced compared with the ordinary man or woman.

Another difficulty in attaining this perfection in morality, is the fact that all humans have “started from evil” and therefore, even if one is completely submerged into “the path of goodness” (72), that person would not be able to erase all previous unlawful acts. Thus, if one is born and continuously raised with the good principle in mind, only then, could he/she possibly be more apt at preserving a moral and good disposition. However, how realistic is this? Kant states that the memory of having committed evil in one’s past, affects that person too personally to erase the guilt completely.

Holiness, or Heiligkeit

One of the difficulties of philosophical reading is the technical and sometimes merely idiosyncratic usage philosophers make of language. For example, the term understanding has a specific meaning when one reads a Kant text, as this refers to the cognitive power that legislates over nature, but is thereby limited to experience. For Kant, understanding is a noun, but one whose analogue would not be comprehension, but something like mental power. Philosophers take words that have conventional meanings and use them outside of those conventions, in such a way that an unprepared reader would doubtlessly experience confusion over the strange employments of the term.

I have selected holiness because it stands between an idiosyncratic and a conventional use. By holiness we tend to think something that commands a profound religious reverence. That reverence we likely attribute to its divine, rather than human, nature. The Bible is holy for its divine inspiration.

Kant first uses this term in the following context, which I think demonstrates its funny status: “If morality cognizes by the holiness of its law an object of the greatest respect, then at the level of religion it presents in the highest cause that carries out those laws an object of worship, and [thus] morality appears in its own majesty.” (7/6, marginal/actual Hackett pagination). Here holiness seems to have meaning both in the context of morality, which belongs wholly to human being, and in the context of religion.

The object of holiness is the moral law, which produces a feeling of respect in the moral agent. It incites respect because it is an unconditional law, that regulates without exception. In this latter aspect it stands radically separate from any civil law. In fact, it is so unique that Kant might contend it finds affinity only by something of divine inspiration, such as the 10 commandments. Yet the basis for the 10 commandments, insofar as it is part of the Bible, is the fact that it was divine revealed (to Moses and transmitted in the Bible). Whereas the moral law is conceived by any and all human beings as rational agents, and it has no origin necessary other than human reason.

In the reading from the “Second Piece”, holiness is used repeatedly in its more familiar context, namely in reference to Jesus Christ, the “Son of God,” or as Kant puts it, the “ideal of holiness”. Yet we should ask after the source of its “holiness.” While it seems clear that Kant intends at least the same reverence as indicated above, is it reverence based in divinity or in the “majesty” of pure rational morality, i.e. humanity? We should ask this question as well because we know, from the preface to the second edition, that Kant considers this work (the Religion book) to be philosophical theology, rather than Biblical theology (13/12). The source of the divinity of philosophical theology is, presumably, morality, yes (6/4)? This is why when we speak of JC, we speak of him not as a historical or even revealed figure, but as the “personified idea of the good principle”. What is more, I cannot help noting that JC is the infinite made finite, and in this respect a holiness that is both (or neither) divine and (nor) human.

Blogging Pointers

Hate to deluge you with information, but my sense is, half of you won't read what I wrote on Blackboard and the other half may want even more explanation. I just want to emphasize a few points.

1) If you compose your blog post in MS Word, then you need to be careful to paste it into the "Edit HTML" window and not the "Compose" window. You may have to do a little bit of formatting after that (in the "Compose" window) to get it the way you want it, but you will have more formatting problems the other way.

2) When I composed, I actually wrote at least 4 pages (1000 words), whereas I only posted 2 pages (500 words) because this was the assignment (you can find out the word count by looking at the bottom of the MS Word window. Stick to the assignment. 

3) I made parenthetical citations to the pages where these matters are discussed at several points. Given this format, this is the easiest way to do this (footnotes would be a drag, perhaps impossible). Since this is a relatively formal piece of writing, plan on doing the same. 

4) I made a couple of mistakes the first time I posted it. I then went back and changed them, quickly and easily. Please do the same. It is both easy and should take no time at all.

5) If you can find an apposite image, add it! The things one finds when you search "radical evil" are not terribly inspiring.

What is a propensity?

“By propensity (propensio) I understand the subjective ground of the possibility of an inclination (habitual desire, concupiscientia), insofar as this possibility is contingent for humanity in general.” (29—this corresponds to the marginal pagination, but the translation may be slightly different because I’ve had to use my Cambridge edition of the Religion book, as even my Hackett copy hasn’t arrived yet).

This reading is on evil, and here Kant is describing the ground or basis of that evil.

In the passage Kant does not mention evil, although he does speak of an “inclination”, and the latter refers to aspects of human action separate from the duties constitutive of moral goodness. Inclination generally refers to the bodily or worldly appetites or desires that emerge from experience and that direct an individual’s action. Any desire for something is by its nature teleological, and therefore inadequate for moral goodness, insofar as Kant identifies the latter with the maxims or rules that direct one’s conduct (not the ends that might direct one’s conduct).

This propensity is necessary in order to explain evil. For evil must result from the power of choice, by which Kant means something different from the types of choices I make everyday. This choice is much deeper and governing than the choices I make, say, for the Cobb salad rather than an omelet. For this choice is the determination of a rule that in turn shapes my conduct.

Briefly, Kant thinks that our actions may be either subjectively or objectively grounded. To be objectively grounded, a purely rational rule—the “moral law”—has been established. This ground is objective because it is dependent upon reason and is also universal and necessary. It is not objective because it is based on the ‘real’ external world, as we are wont to say. If our actions are subjectively grounded, then our desires or appetites have become the rule governing them. This ground is subjective because it comes from our person (in a non-Kantian sense, cf. 27-28), but is not purely rationally determined.

Now why does he speak of the “possibility” of an inclination, especially since this will turn out to be one descriptive of all humanity? Would it not be more accurate to say the “necessity” of an inclination? No, because this inclination is something chosen, and is in this respect a possibility. When Kant says that this possibility is contingent, this seems equally confusing. However, I think that Kant might respond that the predisposition to moral goodness is a necessary possibility, rather than a contingent one, insofar as the rationality of the human being is the basis for that moral goodness. In that respect, human beings are “innately” morally good. Yet, despite this, they do evil acts, and that is because, [1] they must have some force leading them to act morally beyond merely the incentive of the respect for the moral law (27), and [2] that force is the choice a person makes overcoming his propensity to evil, which is equally an act of choice.