“The paradox can also be expressed by saying that there is an absolute duty to God, for in this relationship of duty the single individual relates himself as the single individual absolutely to the absolute.” (61)
Man’s duty to the absolute is formed by man being a single individual in a state of absolute aloneness and in isolation from the universal. The man of faith is formed by entering into a state of aloneness and becoming an absolutely single individual. The man of faith raises himself as an individual above the universal and his being is beyond the restrictions of ethics imposed by the universal.
The man who sands in relation to the universal is a reasonable and ethical man who is understood by the world. The man of faith is aware of the pleasure of being understood by the world, yet he finds the courage to live in isolation for the sake of creating an absolute duty to the absolute. The state of man as being an absolutely single individual is a state of deep inwardness which cannot be expressed to the outer universal world. Any attempt to explain himself to the world would end in failure and he would lose his status of being a single individual man of faith. The man of faith must extinguish any desire to rationalize his faith to the world. For the man of faith loneliness and isolation are the makeup of his being.
If man wanted to enter into the world of faith then man must enter alone with no partner in the experience of faith. The man of faith has no partner to comfort him; his only comfort is his absolute duty to the absolute as a single individual man of faith. As soon as the man of faith tries to find comfort and consolation with someone other than the absolute he ceases to be a man of faith. It is not possible to ask a friend take my hand and let us journey together into the world of faith. Entering into the world of faith must be done with man’s own initiation and alone. The man of faith knows the comfort of resting in the friendly abode of the universal world yet he releases the outer universal world and dwells in inner isolation.
If the man of faith cannot make himself understood by the world then the world will view him as a mad man. But the problem is that if the world cannot understand the man of faith then the world will hate him and this will lead to a conflict between the man of faith and the universal world. Is this conflict avoidable? It can be said for certain that any attempt to explain faith to the universal world would ignite the conflict. But even though the man of faith cannot make himself understood on his own terms, it might be possible for someone in the universal world to see the man of faith through his own loneliness and here the silent’s of faith through his own mind. This vision would claim admiration even from the weakest of men.
Tuesday, July 12, 2011
Sunday, July 10, 2011
Neither a poet nor a philosopher be
How a person goes about achieving faith is an implicit question within Kierkegaard's “fear and trembling.” He explains in which ways faith cannot be achieved but does not overtly explain how to go about obtaining it. It is apparent from the preface that Kierkegaard’s approach in his writing is, in part, a reaction to Hegel’s dialectic philosophy. "I prostrate myself in deepest deference before every systematic snooper: "This is not the System, it does not have the least thing to do with the System." (6)
Hegel developed a system in which all knowledge should fit. Kierkegaard mentions that his writing is "not the system" to make the point clear that faith cannot fit within any conceivable system and so Hegel's system is not the way to go about achieving faith.
He focuses on the example of Abraham’s sacrifice of Isaac which is to be seen as the epitome of perfect faith. With this example it becomes apparent that there is a grand paradox in trying to communicate faith; faith is beyond comprehension. He offers different tales of Abraham’s journey up the mountain that were far more understandable for they were rationally explained ( Abraham pretends to enjoy killed Isaac, feeling sorrow of his deed, ect) For Abraham to be the father of faith, faith cannot be explained to us. Faith should be beyond explanation because it is about the relationship of a person to God not to other people; only God and that singular individual can understand it.
“I have devoted considerable time to understanding the Hegelian philosophy…. All this I do easily, naturally, without getting a headache form it. However when I must thing about Abraham am virtually annihilated.” (27) He says his writing is not philosophy because philosophy can be understood through writings while faith cannot.
This could be why Johannes de Silentio (his pseudonym) mentions that "the present writer is not at all a philosopher; he has not understood the System..." He refers to himself as a non-philosopher; perhaps hinting that faith cannot be found in books or expressed in words. His pseudonym Silentio translates to silent; how one goes about achieving faith is probably what Kierkegaard remains silent about through his book.
Hegel developed a system in which all knowledge should fit. Kierkegaard mentions that his writing is "not the system" to make the point clear that faith cannot fit within any conceivable system and so Hegel's system is not the way to go about achieving faith.
He focuses on the example of Abraham’s sacrifice of Isaac which is to be seen as the epitome of perfect faith. With this example it becomes apparent that there is a grand paradox in trying to communicate faith; faith is beyond comprehension. He offers different tales of Abraham’s journey up the mountain that were far more understandable for they were rationally explained ( Abraham pretends to enjoy killed Isaac, feeling sorrow of his deed, ect) For Abraham to be the father of faith, faith cannot be explained to us. Faith should be beyond explanation because it is about the relationship of a person to God not to other people; only God and that singular individual can understand it.
“I have devoted considerable time to understanding the Hegelian philosophy…. All this I do easily, naturally, without getting a headache form it. However when I must thing about Abraham am virtually annihilated.” (27) He says his writing is not philosophy because philosophy can be understood through writings while faith cannot.
This could be why Johannes de Silentio (his pseudonym) mentions that "the present writer is not at all a philosopher; he has not understood the System..." He refers to himself as a non-philosopher; perhaps hinting that faith cannot be found in books or expressed in words. His pseudonym Silentio translates to silent; how one goes about achieving faith is probably what Kierkegaard remains silent about through his book.
Thursday, July 7, 2011
Faith - Infinity & Finitude
Whether or not faith is something achievable, seems to be the main concern throughout Kierkegaard’s writing. It doesn’t just appear in relation to himself (or Johannes de silentio) but also to all people of this (or current) age/era. Kierkegaard regards the kind of faith Abraham demonstrates not as something that comes naturally or easily, but as something of greater doing or that of something miraculous. The notion of achieving infinity and finity as aspects of the individual who could be considered as truly faithful, as Abraham was, are incorporated into Kierkegaard’s description of such an individual (if one exists). Considering the perspective of the time Kierkegaard is writing, which is not that of the biblical time of Abraham, the kind of faith and devotion that Abraham exhibits is comparably foreign in it expression. Abraham’s act of sacrificing Issac out of faith is something that Kierkegaard delves so deeply into in relation to the probability and capability of those around him to embody and express such faithfulness in its entirety.
In Fear and Trembling, Kierkegaard is unable to know or find such an individual yet imagines they would be someone ordinary, someone not immediately suspected as one holding such true intention, such true depth and purity of faith in God. The description given of such a faithful person is depicted as someone unassuming, humble, a man of routine who appreciates all that passes him by; a simpleton almost, yet he refers to him as a knight. The person who achieves faith is one who moves and lives in infinity and finitude. “He constantly makes the movement of infinity, but he does it with such precision and proficiency that he constantly gets finitude out of it and at no second does one suspect anything else” (pg. 34). Would we even know if we were being called upon to act as Abraham acted and if so, could we demonstrate unwavering faith?
This movement of infinity which Kierkegaard calls knighthood, is the state of making something into that which has no limits; a moment that can live forever because it has been resigned, in a way given up, and in doing so, preserved. The absurdity somehow accounts for its possibility, this notion of infinity because it is not limited to the finite. I think. Faith and absurdity are the aspects of the individual who moves in infinity and in finitude. Finding peace with pain is something of a movement in way of infinity. To perform what is described as “infinite movement of resignation” is a freeing of the limit (finitude) which is what our possessing of something we love puts on it. In essence, to give up that which we love, allows us somehow to keep it, always, by relinquishing the limit of our possession of it. The faith part is in doing this without negotiation, without wavering, without struggle, but to relinquish the moment, person, possession, so that it can exist in the real sense, in infinity. The tough part is that we must first part with that which we love in order to truly have it. This is absurd and at this Kierkegaard marvels.
This concept ends up being described by Kierkegaard as a paradox which he later describes the problems of this paradox of faith found in relation to the story of Abraham.
Whether or not faith is something achievable, seems to be the main concern throughout Kierkegaard’s writing. It doesn’t just appear in relation to himself (or Johannes de silentio) but also to all people of this (or current) age/era. Kierkegaard regards the kind of faith Abraham demonstrates not as something that comes naturally or easily, but as something of greater doing or that of something miraculous. The notion of achieving infinity and finity as aspects of the individual who could be considered as truly faithful, as Abraham was, are incorporated into Kierkegaard’s description of such an individual (if one exists). Considering the perspective of the time Kierkegaard is writing, which is not that of the biblical time of Abraham, the kind of faith and devotion that Abraham exhibits is comparably foreign in it expression. Abraham’s act of sacrificing Issac out of faith is something that Kierkegaard delves so deeply into in relation to the probability and capability of those around him to embody and express such faithfulness in its entirety.
In Fear and Trembling, Kierkegaard is unable to know or find such an individual yet imagines they would be someone ordinary, someone not immediately suspected as one holding such true intention, such true depth and purity of faith in God. The description given of such a faithful person is depicted as someone unassuming, humble, a man of routine who appreciates all that passes him by; a simpleton almost, yet he refers to him as a knight. The person who achieves faith is one who moves and lives in infinity and finitude. “He constantly makes the movement of infinity, but he does it with such precision and proficiency that he constantly gets finitude out of it and at no second does one suspect anything else” (pg. 34). Would we even know if we were being called upon to act as Abraham acted and if so, could we demonstrate unwavering faith?
This movement of infinity which Kierkegaard calls knighthood, is the state of making something into that which has no limits; a moment that can live forever because it has been resigned, in a way given up, and in doing so, preserved. The absurdity somehow accounts for its possibility, this notion of infinity because it is not limited to the finite. I think. Faith and absurdity are the aspects of the individual who moves in infinity and in finitude. Finding peace with pain is something of a movement in way of infinity. To perform what is described as “infinite movement of resignation” is a freeing of the limit (finitude) which is what our possessing of something we love puts on it. In essence, to give up that which we love, allows us somehow to keep it, always, by relinquishing the limit of our possession of it. The faith part is in doing this without negotiation, without wavering, without struggle, but to relinquish the moment, person, possession, so that it can exist in the real sense, in infinity. The tough part is that we must first part with that which we love in order to truly have it. This is absurd and at this Kierkegaard marvels.
This concept ends up being described by Kierkegaard as a paradox which he later describes the problems of this paradox of faith found in relation to the story of Abraham.
Tuesday, July 5, 2011
I’ve Got 99 Problems, but the Teleological Suspension of the Ethical Ain’t One: An Exciting Exploration of Ethics as Universal in Problem I
Kierkegaard or Johannes, whatever he’s calling himself in Problem I, makes the claim that morality is universal. Johannes writes, “the ethical as such is the universal, and as the universal it applies to everyone, which may be expressed from another angle by saying that it is in force at every moment” (46).
What an odd claim to make, right? This would seem to imply that aliens, animals, and vampires are all subjected to the same moral code as humans. But, Johannes probably has a less universal definition of “universal” in mind. He really seems to want to use the term to refer to something that is common to all persons and shared by them, and Johannes clearly believes morality is something shared by all people. This is a fair statement and it aligns nicely with idealistic moral philosophies, such as the Kantian view of morality as a universal a priori reality, or the Hegelian conception of universals (which is clearly Johannes’ target here).
However, in practice, morality seems to suffer from severe cultural relativity. This form of analysis is probably moving us further from the real meat of Johannes’ original position—a critique of Hegelian morality. The universal could be a generic, noncontroversial idea. It could refer to small groups of people with distinct moral belief structures. A group of, say, 450 persons shares a conception of morality that is considered the universal for their community. But, one person in the group—let’s call him Shmabraham—hears voices from God and, in order to prove himself to his talkative God, he must kill his son.
The 450 residents of the town in which Shmabraham lives really hate it when fathers kill their sons, or even try to, and they have created severe punishments for this kind of behavior. Herein lies the paradox of faith: either Shmabraham betrays his God or he betrays the universal conception of morality. Do we allow the individual to go outside of the universal? Is there a teleological suspension of the ethical? Clearly, people such as Johannes, Kierkegaard himself, and Muslim extremists want to say that faith trumps the universal. Furthermore, Johannes claims that it would be absurd to call Shmabraham a murderer, even though, according to Hegel, he violates “universal” morality (since faith is transcended by rational thought in Hegel’s view). Therefore, Johannes believes that religious faith is higher or at least outside of rational thought. But, how does society determine whether someone is a hero of faith or a zealot? The actual paradox seems to be, then, if we allow faith to be a viable motive in a causal world, how is society to evaluate whether an action rooted outside of the universal is tolerable each time?
Sunday, July 3, 2011
Kierkegaard's Faith in Real Life
In the chapter “Preliminary Outpouring” of Fear and Trembling, Kierkegaard questions how Abraham’s actions can be justified in the eye of the general public. Can everybody follow Abraham’s steps with the thought of committing murder, and then hope to achieve joy and peace after the killing? How applicable is it?
Kierkegaard differentiates Abraham’s acts by his loyal commitment to faith. In other words, Abraham is wholeheartedly convinced that he is acting upon God’s will and that whatever happened in outcome would grant him happiness, irrespective of Isaac’s end, because of his sincere devotion to faith. If, however, faith was taken away from him, his act would simply be considered brutal and purposeless.
What one must first strive for, is infinite resignation. In the second part of the chapter, Kierkegaard focuses on infinite resignation; that is, renouncing the one most important and most meaningful desire that one believes will give rise to happiness. If one is capable of renouncing this desire to its extent, it will serve like a fortified wall shielding the spirit from any jeopardy of the finite world. Kierkegaard claims that everyone is competent enough to reach infinite resignation. By reaching this state, you eliminate the possibility of even thinking of the impossible. Instead, you are fully guided by your spirit, and thus able to attain your potential since “spiritually speaking, everything is possible” (37). In other words, once you are immersed in this state of being, you will not be deceived; this is because, by renouncing and being self-sufficient, “peace and rest” await you (38).
The next step after resigning is faith. Faith presupposes one to have already resigned and to have already achieved eternal consciousness. Yet, there is a paradox. It is supposed that to get more than eternal consciousness, faith is needed. This is where Kierkegaard introduces the concept of the absurd. He argues that by faith you will receive what you initially resigned for. “By faith Abraham did not renounce Isaac, but by faith Abraham received Isaac” (41).
Yet, the feasibility of this faith is what elicits debate amidst Kierkegaard’s argument. Kierkegaard confesses the difficulties and misunderstandings that is expected when aiming to achieve this “movement.” He often articulates the “miraculous” nature of faith, and when relating to Abraham, states, “I cannot think myself into Abraham” (27). As soon as he attempts to apply this thought process in reality, he encounters obstacles, expressing the impossible; “I can swim in life, but for this mystical floating I am too heavy” (42).
Thus, instead of attempting to mirror Abraham, Kierkegaard offers you to judge for yourself the totality of the depiction of Abraham to see if you have the courage to venture something similar.
Kierkegaard differentiates Abraham’s acts by his loyal commitment to faith. In other words, Abraham is wholeheartedly convinced that he is acting upon God’s will and that whatever happened in outcome would grant him happiness, irrespective of Isaac’s end, because of his sincere devotion to faith. If, however, faith was taken away from him, his act would simply be considered brutal and purposeless.
What one must first strive for, is infinite resignation. In the second part of the chapter, Kierkegaard focuses on infinite resignation; that is, renouncing the one most important and most meaningful desire that one believes will give rise to happiness. If one is capable of renouncing this desire to its extent, it will serve like a fortified wall shielding the spirit from any jeopardy of the finite world. Kierkegaard claims that everyone is competent enough to reach infinite resignation. By reaching this state, you eliminate the possibility of even thinking of the impossible. Instead, you are fully guided by your spirit, and thus able to attain your potential since “spiritually speaking, everything is possible” (37). In other words, once you are immersed in this state of being, you will not be deceived; this is because, by renouncing and being self-sufficient, “peace and rest” await you (38).
The next step after resigning is faith. Faith presupposes one to have already resigned and to have already achieved eternal consciousness. Yet, there is a paradox. It is supposed that to get more than eternal consciousness, faith is needed. This is where Kierkegaard introduces the concept of the absurd. He argues that by faith you will receive what you initially resigned for. “By faith Abraham did not renounce Isaac, but by faith Abraham received Isaac” (41).
Yet, the feasibility of this faith is what elicits debate amidst Kierkegaard’s argument. Kierkegaard confesses the difficulties and misunderstandings that is expected when aiming to achieve this “movement.” He often articulates the “miraculous” nature of faith, and when relating to Abraham, states, “I cannot think myself into Abraham” (27). As soon as he attempts to apply this thought process in reality, he encounters obstacles, expressing the impossible; “I can swim in life, but for this mystical floating I am too heavy” (42).
Thus, instead of attempting to mirror Abraham, Kierkegaard offers you to judge for yourself the totality of the depiction of Abraham to see if you have the courage to venture something similar.
The Concept of Faith
A knight of Faith, in Kierkegaard’s Fear and Trembling, acts without questions, or hesitation, independently from the norms and ideas of society with belief in him or herself because the actions he/she participates in is believed by the individual to be a duty set out by God.
In the story of the man and the princess, the man of infinity believes that he should be with the princess, but he gives up on her and believes that they can be together in another life or world, which is absurd on the finite plane. On the other hand the knight of faith feels almost exactly like the knight of infinity although he believes that he will be with her in his lifetime. It seems as if the knight of faith has hope in the romance even though he is not with the princess. The knight of infinity has belief in God and God alone; while the knight of faith has belief in himself and in God, which may be what faith is.
Faith is also brought up in the story of Abraham and Isaac. Abraham’s duty was to sacrifice his son, Isaac. Abraham went on to faithfully execute his duties without hesitation, without saying anything to anyone, and as he was about to sacrifice Isaac, an angel came out and rewarded Abraham with his son back.
This story is a paradox: if killing is a sin, which was even made into a commandment, then why would Abraham follow the voice of God, who told him to kill his son? This is a question of doubt, and in doubt there is no faith. In the story Abraham did not question himself, and he didn’t even reach out to anybody else with what to do in this absurd predicament. Abraham faithfully followed what he had been told to do, and absurdly (rationally impossibly) he was rewarded his son back thanks to an angel. Whether this story is a poetic metaphor for Abraham believing that he still has his son in imagination land, or whether he became conscious of what he was doing and didn’t kill his son because of an angel he may have seen; Abraham was still willing to fulfill his duty.
The concept of faith, according to Kierkegaard is a paradox because firstly the man/woman has to believe in infinite resignation, which is the strength to give up everything finite; but at the same time believe that the impossible is possible. It seems as if faith is another word for hope. Although in the story of Abraham and the man it seems as if Faith is also confidence in oneself.
1) Indifference to the norms and ideas of society
2) Belief in God
3) Belief in oneself
4) The ability to give every finite noun up
5) The confidence/ability/courage to take action
Friday, July 1, 2011
Issac needs a better Gaard: An entry of conceptual co-dependency and impracticality
In these first looks at Kierkegaard’s Fear and Trembling, valid investigation lies within the contingent yet necessarily differential nature of relationships between rationality and faith.
Johannes de silentio’s most religiously neutral example is between the role of the hero and the poet. This relationship is direct but also hierarchical; poet’s skills are useless without those of the hero to actualize the record and the hero’s fame robbed of immortality without any way to reminisce them. Memories serve as a way for heroic acts to become examples attainable greatness and a way to maintain an exemplary template to measure those deeds upon forthcoming generations. Through their sustainability, these acts become ideals or an activation of understanding. If faith is the talk at hand, the implementation of an ideal comes with the New Testament with Jesus Christ. However, Johannes de silentio remains in the Old Testament for his example of faith in God because for initially two clear reasons. Firstly, that the Old Testament is an example of ideals transcending text into reasons for action metaphorically, and secondly, that it is precisely to act that is important to his key example, the faith physically within the biblical patriarch Abraham.
Johannes gives multiple scenarios of instances where Abraham’s faith in God could have been altered by doubt motivated by reason. We rely on Johannes de silentio to preserve the necessity for faith-based philosophy that is dependant on the scripture recounting Abraham’s deeds. Furthermore, the legitimacy of such and its permeability through time is dependant on Abraham’s initial sincerity of faith (and lack of rationality) as simultaneously the roots of Christian civilization. This epic flow of events whittles down to the spark: the perseverance of God to have always fulfilled that faith.
Kierkegaard has become a figurehead for both his role in the existentialist movement and his specifically faith based philosophy -- two fields dependant on a search for meaning. While the attempt to relieve human kind of the dogmatic nature of Christian doctrine initiated a wave of at times nihilistic doubt, Kierkegaard’s need for passion re-implements grounds for fanaticism averted Kantian reason. We rely, through Johanne’s recount, precisely that – recounted revealed reasons to spur forth a faith within us that harks of a priori reason insofar as it is motivating us before we are to know instances in which it is to show itself.
Despite the disheartening and at times seemingly futile effort of finding a base in reasoning (as in Kant), without striving for a type of absolute knowledge through reason our the time of this text, of the Hegelian system and the Kierkegaardian faith, by allowing elements of passion and feeling to become forces bound on a quest to meaning that dilute their sustainability with motivation by weaker sources. The classic battle of faith against reason within Pascal’s wager seems like the closest middle ground between faith and reason, a mediation that remains as disheartening as any Kantian argument.
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