Sunday, July 3, 2011

Kierkegaard's Faith in Real Life

In the chapter “Preliminary Outpouring” of Fear and Trembling, Kierkegaard questions how Abraham’s actions can be justified in the eye of the general public. Can everybody follow Abraham’s steps with the thought of committing murder, and then hope to achieve joy and peace after the killing? How applicable is it?

Kierkegaard differentiates Abraham’s acts by his loyal commitment to faith. In other words, Abraham is wholeheartedly convinced that he is acting upon God’s will and that whatever happened in outcome would grant him happiness, irrespective of Isaac’s end, because of his sincere devotion to faith. If, however, faith was taken away from him, his act would simply be considered brutal and purposeless.

What one must first strive for, is infinite resignation. In the second part of the chapter, Kierkegaard focuses on infinite resignation; that is, renouncing the one most important and most meaningful desire that one believes will give rise to happiness. If one is capable of renouncing this desire to its extent, it will serve like a fortified wall shielding the spirit from any jeopardy of the finite world. Kierkegaard claims that everyone is competent enough to reach infinite resignation. By reaching this state, you eliminate the possibility of even thinking of the impossible. Instead, you are fully guided by your spirit, and thus able to attain your potential since “spiritually speaking, everything is possible” (37). In other words, once you are immersed in this state of being, you will not be deceived; this is because, by renouncing and being self-sufficient, “peace and rest” await you (38).

The next step after resigning is faith. Faith presupposes one to have already resigned and to have already achieved eternal consciousness. Yet, there is a paradox. It is supposed that to get more than eternal consciousness, faith is needed. This is where Kierkegaard introduces the concept of the absurd. He argues that by faith you will receive what you initially resigned for. “By faith Abraham did not renounce Isaac, but by faith Abraham received Isaac” (41).

Yet, the feasibility of this faith is what elicits debate amidst Kierkegaard’s argument. Kierkegaard confesses the difficulties and misunderstandings that is expected when aiming to achieve this “movement.” He often articulates the “miraculous” nature of faith, and when relating to Abraham, states, “I cannot think myself into Abraham” (27). As soon as he attempts to apply this thought process in reality, he encounters obstacles, expressing the impossible; “I can swim in life, but for this mystical floating I am too heavy” (42).

Thus, instead of attempting to mirror Abraham, Kierkegaard offers you to judge for yourself the totality of the depiction of Abraham to see if you have the courage to venture something similar.

The Concept of Faith


A knight of Faith, in Kierkegaard’s Fear and Trembling, acts without questions, or hesitation, independently from the norms and ideas of society with belief in him or herself because the actions he/she participates in is believed by the individual to be a duty set out by God.

In the story of the man and the princess, the man of infinity believes that he should be with the princess, but he gives up on her and believes that they can be together in another life or world, which is absurd on the finite plane. On the other hand the knight of faith feels almost exactly like the knight of infinity although he believes that he will be with her in his lifetime. It seems as if the knight of faith has hope in the romance even though he is not with the princess. The knight of infinity has belief in God and God alone; while the knight of faith has belief in himself and in God, which may be what faith is.

Faith is also brought up in the story of Abraham and Isaac. Abraham’s duty was to sacrifice his son, Isaac. Abraham went on to faithfully execute his duties without hesitation, without saying anything to anyone, and as he was about to sacrifice Isaac, an angel came out and rewarded Abraham with his son back.

This story is a paradox: if killing is a sin, which was even made into a commandment, then why would Abraham follow the voice of God, who told him to kill his son? This is a question of doubt, and in doubt there is no faith. In the story Abraham did not question himself, and he didn’t even reach out to anybody else with what to do in this absurd predicament. Abraham faithfully followed what he had been told to do, and absurdly (rationally impossibly) he was rewarded his son back thanks to an angel. Whether this story is a poetic metaphor for Abraham believing that he still has his son in imagination land, or whether he became conscious of what he was doing and didn’t kill his son because of an angel he may have seen; Abraham was still willing to fulfill his duty.

The concept of faith, according to Kierkegaard is a paradox because firstly the man/woman has to believe in infinite resignation, which is the strength to give up everything finite; but at the same time believe that the impossible is possible. It seems as if faith is another word for hope. Although in the story of Abraham and the man it seems as if Faith is also confidence in oneself.

Whatever faith may be, it seems to shares the following qualities:

1) Indifference to the norms and ideas of society

2) Belief in God

3) Belief in oneself

4) The ability to give every finite noun up

5) The confidence/ability/courage to take action

Friday, July 1, 2011

Issac needs a better Gaard: An entry of conceptual co-dependency and impracticality

In these first looks at Kierkegaard’s Fear and Trembling, valid investigation lies within the contingent yet necessarily differential nature of relationships between rationality and faith.


Johannes de silentio’s most religiously neutral example is between the role of the hero and the poet. This relationship is direct but also hierarchical; poet’s skills are useless without those of the hero to actualize the record and the hero’s fame robbed of immortality without any way to reminisce them. Memories serve as a way for heroic acts to become examples attainable greatness and a way to maintain an exemplary template to measure those deeds upon forthcoming generations. Through their sustainability, these acts become ideals or an activation of understanding. If faith is the talk at hand, the implementation of an ideal comes with the New Testament with Jesus Christ. However, Johannes de silentio remains in the Old Testament for his example of faith in God because for initially two clear reasons. Firstly, that the Old Testament is an example of ideals transcending text into reasons for action metaphorically, and secondly, that it is precisely to act that is important to his key example, the faith physically within the biblical patriarch Abraham.


Johannes gives multiple scenarios of instances where Abraham’s faith in God could have been altered by doubt motivated by reason. We rely on Johannes de silentio to preserve the necessity for faith-based philosophy that is dependant on the scripture recounting Abraham’s deeds. Furthermore, the legitimacy of such and its permeability through time is dependant on Abraham’s initial sincerity of faith (and lack of rationality) as simultaneously the roots of Christian civilization. This epic flow of events whittles down to the spark: the perseverance of God to have always fulfilled that faith.


Kierkegaard has become a figurehead for both his role in the existentialist movement and his specifically faith based philosophy -- two fields dependant on a search for meaning. While the attempt to relieve human kind of the dogmatic nature of Christian doctrine initiated a wave of at times nihilistic doubt, Kierkegaard’s need for passion re-implements grounds for fanaticism averted Kantian reason. We rely, through Johanne’s recount, precisely that – recounted revealed reasons to spur forth a faith within us that harks of a priori reason insofar as it is motivating us before we are to know instances in which it is to show itself.


Despite the disheartening and at times seemingly futile effort of finding a base in reasoning (as in Kant), without striving for a type of absolute knowledge through reason our the time of this text, of the Hegelian system and the Kierkegaardian faith, by allowing elements of passion and feeling to become forces bound on a quest to meaning that dilute their sustainability with motivation by weaker sources. The classic battle of faith against reason within Pascal’s wager seems like the closest middle ground between faith and reason, a mediation that remains as disheartening as any Kantian argument.

Thursday, June 30, 2011

Dose the world vanish in God's unity?

“God is a thinking being; but the objects that he thinks and comprehends are, like his mind, not distinguished form his being. Thus, in thinking the objects, he thinks only himself, namely, he remains in an unbroken unity with himself.”

In this passage Feuerbach expresses the idea that God thinking is not thinking of objects which are outside of God. Unlike human beings who’s thought is only possible when there are objects outside of the self (subject), with Gods thought there is no distinction between subject (God) and object . God thinking of objects is thinking of objects as they are God. But how can this idea be sated as a coherent thought, it seams that this idea can lead to the world being God. According to this passage, God can only think of himself but not of anything outside of God. Now suppose God thinks of the world it seams the only way this is possible is if the world is God himself (nature or God).

Furthermore, in this passage it is implied that God is essentially thought, reason or intellect. But if God is viewed as the intellect this can be a problem for the notion of the unity of God. The concepts of intellect and understanding can only bed applied to an object which can be broken and divided in to components. We do not understand objects as holistic beings, rather, we analyze and comprehend parts and components of objects. If God is thought or intellect then there would be the possibility of braking apart and dividing God in to components. This would be an absurdity and a contradiction to the unity of God.

Class is cancelled today, see you Tuesday

Tuesday, June 28, 2011

Kierkegaard & Faith

In the Preface of Kierkegaard’s Fear and Trembling his character, Johannes de silentio critiques the modern attitude towards doubt and faith which is reached, he believes, in a way that is much too simple. He compares the modern man’s ability to reach doubt and faith to Descartes’ doubt or those of even older philosophers who reached doubt with intense questioning and logical processes. Faith is now also considered something easily attainable, a default of nearly every individual whereas it was once considered something much more challenging to obtain.

In the next section of our reading, “Tuning Up,” Johannes discusses various ways in which the story of Abraham and his son Isaac could be rendered. The true story where Isaac is murdered by his father, is an example of perfect faith in God. The retellings that are outlined here do not help anyone to understand Abraham’s actions because, if I understand Johannes meaning, Abraham’s faith is not something that we should try or can understand. These retellings don’t lead the man who is thinking of them anywhere and we will be equally as lost in attempting to make sense of them. One can only understand Abraham’s actions if one understands faith wholly.

Johannes discusses in the following section, “A Tribute to Abraham,” what makes a great man which he claims is determined by a man’s love, expectation, and struggle. The greatest of men will be those who love God, expect the impossible, and struggle with God. Abraham was of the greatest men because he felt these three things, because his faith in god was so unwavering and unconditional. Johannes continues to express Abraham’s greatness by telling his life story and how all of his brave actions by faith.

Heading into the reading ahead, we know 4 things about faith as it is defined and presented in Fear and Trembling:

1. Its opposite is doubt
2. It is not something that we can understand or obtain easily
3. Faith is a requirement for the religious man
4. And it is a requirement for the greatest of men to live by it

Is There Still A Place for Philosophy in Grundsätze der Philosophie der Zukunft: Aphorisms on Being, Time, and Sex



(OR) My God Is Purple With Pink Polka Dots, Although He Is Really Only an Expression of My True Human Essence

I.
Being

Feuerbach promises nothing less than the philosophy of the future, but he chooses instead to spend 65.714% of the book looking backward toward the philosophy and theology of the past. In doing so, he does make some pretty spectacular suppositions. For instance, he claims that theology and speculative philosophy, while trying to posit God, end up only affirming atheism (22-23). More importantly (what can be more substantial than the complete dissolution of God, you ask), Feuerbach states that the old-fashioned philosophy said “I” is only an abstract thinking being which is distinct from its physical body, but, but, the new, better, futuristic philosophy says, “I am a real, sensuous being, and, indeed, the body in its totality is my ego, my essence itself” (54). Philosophy that made thought primary, casting doubt on the world of the senses, reversed the order of things. The formation of ideas, rational thought, and the squawking voice of consciousness are all just by-products of a real, complete, holistic sensuous being.



II.
Time

It may seem a bit pompous of Feuerbach to title his book Principles of the Philosophy of the Future if all he is doing is eliminating God and dualism from the philosophical equation (where are the ontological jet packs already?). However, Feuerbach’s positive philosophy (if there is one to be found) is profoundly linked to man’s notion of time. First, he claims that “space and time are not mere forms of appearance; they are conditions of being, forms of reason, and laws of existence as well as thought” (60). Man’s sense of being here, now, in a space, in a time, with the external world impinging on him is reality (Das Dasein is not very futuristic, you challenge). Wait, the future is coming. Feuerbach contends that time is the only way to explain and “unite” contradictory “determinations” in a single being (63). Thought therefore breaks up time into fractional time slices, which interrupts continuous sensuous experience (64). Back to the future, the conceptual future is, Feuerbach declares, found in the fulfillment of man’s potential through unity with fellow man. That’s the future of man, a communal utopia, and the philosophy of the future should align itself with the needs of mankind (73).



III.
Sex

Can an aphorism be composed as a question and still be an aphorism?
Does Feuerbach’s explanation of man’s conception of God really explain God or man’s need to posit such a being? Isn’t the fear of the unknown, the infinity preceding our existence and the infinity that is sure to follow, that which forces man to create God, as a coping mechanism? If we remove metaphysics from the philosophical equation, isn’t philosophy only left to clean up practical empirical problems, like science’s janitor? Isn’t Feuerbach the sexiest thing we’ve read? Wouldn’t sex be the highest activity for Feuerbach since it combines the most intimate form of unity with fellow man, and with more people being a happy end result of the act?