Dose the world vanish in God's unity?

“God is a thinking being; but the objects that he thinks and comprehends are, like his mind, not distinguished form his being. Thus, in thinking the objects, he thinks only himself, namely, he remains in an unbroken unity with himself.”

In this passage Feuerbach expresses the idea that God thinking is not thinking of objects which are outside of God. Unlike human beings who’s thought is only possible when there are objects outside of the self (subject), with Gods thought there is no distinction between subject (God) and object . God thinking of objects is thinking of objects as they are God. But how can this idea be sated as a coherent thought, it seams that this idea can lead to the world being God. According to this passage, God can only think of himself but not of anything outside of God. Now suppose God thinks of the world it seams the only way this is possible is if the world is God himself (nature or God).

Furthermore, in this passage it is implied that God is essentially thought, reason or intellect. But if God is viewed as the intellect this can be a problem for the notion of the unity of God. The concepts of intellect and understanding can only bed applied to an object which can be broken and divided in to components. We do not understand objects as holistic beings, rather, we analyze and comprehend parts and components of objects. If God is thought or intellect then there would be the possibility of braking apart and dividing God in to components. This would be an absurdity and a contradiction to the unity of God.

Class is cancelled today, see you Tuesday

Kierkegaard & Faith

In the Preface of Kierkegaard’s Fear and Trembling his character, Johannes de silentio critiques the modern attitude towards doubt and faith which is reached, he believes, in a way that is much too simple. He compares the modern man’s ability to reach doubt and faith to Descartes’ doubt or those of even older philosophers who reached doubt with intense questioning and logical processes. Faith is now also considered something easily attainable, a default of nearly every individual whereas it was once considered something much more challenging to obtain.

In the next section of our reading, “Tuning Up,” Johannes discusses various ways in which the story of Abraham and his son Isaac could be rendered. The true story where Isaac is murdered by his father, is an example of perfect faith in God. The retellings that are outlined here do not help anyone to understand Abraham’s actions because, if I understand Johannes meaning, Abraham’s faith is not something that we should try or can understand. These retellings don’t lead the man who is thinking of them anywhere and we will be equally as lost in attempting to make sense of them. One can only understand Abraham’s actions if one understands faith wholly.

Johannes discusses in the following section, “A Tribute to Abraham,” what makes a great man which he claims is determined by a man’s love, expectation, and struggle. The greatest of men will be those who love God, expect the impossible, and struggle with God. Abraham was of the greatest men because he felt these three things, because his faith in god was so unwavering and unconditional. Johannes continues to express Abraham’s greatness by telling his life story and how all of his brave actions by faith.

Heading into the reading ahead, we know 4 things about faith as it is defined and presented in Fear and Trembling:

1. Its opposite is doubt

2. It is not something that we can understand or obtain easily

3. Faith is a requirement for the religious man

4. And it is a requirement for the greatest of men to live by it

Is There Still A Place for Philosophy in Grundsätze der Philosophie der Zukunft: Aphorisms on Being, Time, and Sex

(OR) My God Is Purple With Pink Polka Dots, Although He Is Really Only an Expression of My True Human Essence

I.
Being

Feuerbach promises nothing less than the philosophy of the future, but he chooses instead to spend 65.714% of the book looking backward toward the philosophy and theology of the past. In doing so, he does make some pretty spectacular suppositions. For instance, he claims that theology and speculative philosophy, while trying to posit God, end up only affirming atheism (22-23). More importantly (what can be more substantial than the complete dissolution of God, you ask), Feuerbach states that the old-fashioned philosophy said “I” is only an abstract thinking being which is distinct from its physical body, but, but, the new, better, futuristic philosophy says, “I am a real, sensuous being, and, indeed, the body in its totality is my ego, my essence itself” (54). Philosophy that made thought primary, casting doubt on the world of the senses, reversed the order of things. The formation of ideas, rational thought, and the squawking voice of consciousness are all just by-products of a real, complete, holistic sensuous being.



II.
Time

It may seem a bit pompous of Feuerbach to title his book Principles of the Philosophy of the Future if all he is doing is eliminating God and dualism from the philosophical equation (where are the ontological jet packs already?). However, Feuerbach’s positive philosophy (if there is one to be found) is profoundly linked to man’s notion of time. First, he claims that “space and time are not mere forms of appearance; they are conditions of being, forms of reason, and laws of existence as well as thought” (60). Man’s sense of being here, now, in a space, in a time, with the external world impinging on him is reality (Das Dasein is not very futuristic, you challenge). Wait, the future is coming. Feuerbach contends that time is the only way to explain and “unite” contradictory “determinations” in a single being (63). Thought therefore breaks up time into fractional time slices, which interrupts continuous sensuous experience (64). Back to the future, the conceptual future is, Feuerbach declares, found in the fulfillment of man’s potential through unity with fellow man. That’s the future of man, a communal utopia, and the philosophy of the future should align itself with the needs of mankind (73).



III.
Sex

Can an aphorism be composed as a question and still be an aphorism?
Does Feuerbach’s explanation of man’s conception of God really explain God or man’s need to posit such a being? Isn’t the fear of the unknown, the infinity preceding our existence and the infinity that is sure to follow, that which forces man to create God, as a coping mechanism? If we remove metaphysics from the philosophical equation, isn’t philosophy only left to clean up practical empirical problems, like science’s janitor? Isn’t Feuerbach the sexiest thing we’ve read? Wouldn’t sex be the highest activity for Feuerbach since it combines the most intimate form of unity with fellow man, and with more people being a happy end result of the act?

Open-Hearted Philosophy

In the Principles of the Philosophy of the Future, Ludwig Feuerbach brings to light what he calls “the sensuous.” The sensuous, unlike thinking which is the result of human rationality, is that which is felt with human feeling and emotion .

What is differing in Feuerbach’s argument is, whereas the old philosopher was in continuous opposition with the senses, the new philosopher thinks “in harmony and peace with the senses” (54), therefore uniting both thought and being.

Feuerbach wishes to differentiate the sensuous from thinking. In other words, reality that is deciphered by thought first and then perceived by sensation is a “contradiction.” If one consciously reasons about the idea first and then experiences the sensation second, then the sensation merely becomes an attribute of the idea. Yet, the sensuous should be made into its own subject, independent from thought, wherein the primary meaning of truth is not obtained from the idea. Feuerbach argues that the true and divine should not require a proof but instead should be sensed with immediate knowledge - for instance, that which speaks for itself, that is certain and straightforward. Also, it is evident that it is only through the senses that one has access to immediate knowledge, unlike rationality.

Furthermore, it is only when one is capable of passion and love does he deserve the name of being. Human beings should not exist only as thinking beings, but as sensuous beings also; in other words, heavily influenced by human blood, human instinct. That is, they should exist with their senses: perception, feeling, and love. Yet, human senses, as Feuerbach elaborates the idea, is not limited to external things only, such as hearing the sound of the waves, but it is also internal, what the human mind makes of it, in which the same sounds of the waves can be, “the soulful voice of love and wisdom” (58). Thus, he admits to the importance of empiricism, but he wishes to emphasize - especially to the old philosophers that perceive rational as the real and highest notion - that “man” is the rational, the centre of reason. He encourages human interaction, because things can only be certain if they are believed by another.

In Principles, Feuerbach reveals how the deepest and highest truths are concealed in human feeling, and thus, in man himself. In this work, his aim is to have the meaning and essence of feeling elevated to consciousness, so that one can think as a living and real being, instead of as a thinker only.

Hegel and rational choice

http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/06/19/the-failure-of-rational-choice/?src=twrhp

Feuerbach; reason=god=man

Feuerbach is the first reading which I actually enjoyed which thus entailed somewhat of an understanding of the reading. Feuerbach weaves his way through a few ideas; ideas which range from the contradiction of Theists to a concept which I will be discussing; reason and its equivalence to god, and god’s equivalence to man.

The first 15 pages are so seem to be devoted to picking away at religion; Feuerbach first seems to acknowledge a god-a theological god-and this god’s relation to reason. Section 6 of the Principles of the Philosophy of the Future is where Feuerbach launches this slow attack on religion. This quote shows Feuerbach’s take on god and its relation to reason: “…is nothing but the essence of reason itself” (Feuerbach Section 6) here we can evidently see Feuerbach’s idea of god and what, in actuality god is. Throughout section 6 Feuerbach seems to create a relationship between god and reason, and it seemed at first-to me of course-that Feuerbach seems to accept a notion of god but that his god is not the theological one which Christianity poses but rather one that seems to encompass reason. Later Feuerbach seems to say that if you limit reason you limit god, meaning that, if we conceive of reason as being limited by sensation then god is limited by sensation, here he seems to begin to demean the theological definition of god (Here also began my question of whether Feuerbach believed in a god of some sort). In Section 7 of the reading Feuerbach seems to attack the theist directly, in what seems to me as a logical fallacy in the theist’s claims and it is this which I feel Feuerbach is exploiting. “He conceives god as a being; namely, according to his imagination, god is a spiritual and unsensuous being, but, in accordance with actuality, that is, with the truth, he is a sensuous being…” (Feuerbach Section 7).

It is in section 7 which Feuerbach seems to make the transition from god being equivalent to reason to god being a creation of man (This is where I was convinced Feuerbach does not believe in god). “God is an object of man, and only of man;” further down he says “If, now, god is an object of man-and indeed inasmuch as he really is a necessary and essential object-what is expressed in the being of this object is merely the peculiar essence of man.” (Feuerbach Section 7). I believe what Feuerbach is saying is that god is only what we have created it to be, an image of ourselves into this metaphysical being. Feuerbach continues his attack on the theological god in Section 8 where he states contradictions in both the idea of religion and religion’s idea of god. “In short, man transforms his thoughts and even his emotions into thoughts and emotions of god” a few lines down he says: “…god is self-contradictory, for he is supposed to be a non-human and superhuman being;” (Feuerbach Section 8). At this point I was not only intrigued by Feuerbach’s remarks but fully convinced on Feuerbach’s perspective on god, and its relation to man; the thinking thing.

Later in the reading Feuerbach says some interesting things which have by then deviated slightly to my concept of discussion; if a being on a comet was to encounter the religious scriptures of theology, also another very bold statement in which Mankind as a whole, as a species has achieved a divine knowledge. It is this last statement which I feel is directly related to the title Principles of the Philosophy of the Future, Feuerbach’s analysis of mankind as a species and it’s knowledge being that of divine nature is only further supported by later scientists’ discoveries like Alan Turing, Benoit Mandelbrot and many others.

How does man achieve freedom?

Well, obviously, through Feuerbach’s new Philosophy of the Future. But first, let’s denounce modern philosophical thought and religion.

More seriously, on page 19, Feuerbach makes an important claim: “That from which God is free, from that you must liberate yourself if you want to reach God; and you make yourself really free when you conceive him. Consequently, if you think of God as a being that does not presuppose any other beings or objects, then you yourself will also think without presupposing an external object; the attribute that you affix to God is an attribute of your thought. Only what is activity in man is being in God or imagined as such.” In order for man to be free, he must liberate himself from all that God has liberated himself from--from the sensuous and material objects of the world. Man must realize the essence of reason for that which is in man’s essence will be in his mind. With the realization of reason, man can be truly free.

Taking a step back to the beginning of this reading. Feuerbach spends a significant amount of time differentiating between ordinary theology and speculative philosophy. Ordinary theology imagines God as a being that is completely independent from reason and as a fantasy where as speculative philosophy, strives to present God as rational and as truth itself. Feuerbach claims that if one cannot imagine a being without its senses then God will also be limited by his senses. Philosophy claims that God surpasses these limitations of theology with the realization that reason is satisfied in the infinite being. Just as the essence of the eye is revealed to us through the object of the eye, the essence of reason is revealed to us through the object of god. This determines a certain relationship between man and god: “the essence of the subject [is] derived from the essence of the object” (10). Thus, the essence of man is derived from the essence of God according to speculative philosophy. God is determining the thoughts of man according to modern speculative philosophy whereas in ordinary theology, man determines the thoughts of God because he exists in man’s imagination. According to Descartes and Leibniz, only God can conceive “all things without obscurity, that is, without the senses and the imagination” (13).

Theology and speculative philosophy also differ in their conception of God’s knowledge. Theology because it attributes strictly the senses to God, sees his knowledge as strictly empirical. Divine, sensuous knowledge is all-knowing but in a way that is minute and practically insignificant (he gives the example of God knowing each hair on a man’s head because each hair itself has been counted). This divine knowledge is another fantasy, another thing that Feuerbach believes lies in the imagination. Speculative philosophy posits that God’s knowledge is abstracted from the material and is based in reason.

Theology only conceives of god as a being wholly separated from man and nature. When speculative philosophy tries to intertwine God and man with its ideas of its similarities, God is negated. The traditional theological thinker has a fundamentally different view of God from the modern speculative philosopher but both schools of thought seem to lead to the negation of God--or his lack of existence. Now that man has freed himself from these problematic theories--man needs a new philosophy--a philosophy of the future.

natural religon versus positive religon

“So called natural religion is usually so refined and has such philosophical and moral manners that it allows little of the unique character of religion to shine through; it know how to live so politely , to restrain and accommodate itself so well that it is tolerated everywhere. In contrast, every positive religion has exceedingly strong features and a very marked physiognomy so that it unfailingly reminds one of what it really is with every moment it makes and with every glance one casts upon it.”(98)

In this passage Schleiermacher contrasts positive religion and natural religion. Neither natural religion nor positive religion embodies what true religion is. Both have fundamental flaws that prevent them from becoming true religion.

Religion for Schleiermacher is emotionally and sensory motivated. True religion occurs when a person understands their relationship to the infinite. Both natural and positive religion fail to reach this understanding.

He argues that positive religion; while not true religion is much preferred to natural religion. Positive religion is what organized faith is; it is defined by rituals, scriptures, and tradition; it is the kind of religion that Kant wrote so strongly against.

Schleiermacher agrees with Kant that there are flaws within positive religion. Positive religion has a tendency to focus on aspects that will hinder religion instead of help. They focus on empty tradition instead of the practitioner’s personal experience, they emphasize the differences among positive religion discouraging people to understand the infinite in their own way. Positive religion can never be true religion because of the way organized faith imposes its one interpretation of the infinite on others. Religion is something that must happen through personal experience and so forcing religion on others and discouraging the discovery of personal religious truths in the way institutionalized religion does will never be successful.

. He does not, however, see positive religion as completely pointless because he thinks that at the core of positive religion is the “intuition of the infinite.” Positive religion is much better than natural religion for it has the essence of religion; which unfortunately becomes corrupted through the institutionalization of organized faith.

Natural religion (the kind Kant defended), on the other hand, has no merit in Schleiermacher’s eyes; he sees it as devoid of anything resembling religion. He uses the words “refined,” “manners,” “polite” and “tolerated” in his explanation of natural religion. The contrast between the passive diction he uses to describe natural religion and the active way he describes the raw experimentally based true religion is stark. Natural religion disregards intuition and so Schleiermacher does not see how anyone can be led to religion intuitively through it.

I think there is a tension between Schleiermacher’s assertion that religion is a personal way of coming to understand the infinite and his condemnation of natural religion. It seems that some people may be more prone to understand the infinite through reason rather than emotion. It is strange that he advocates for personal experience with religion and yet he does not approve any interpretation for the definition of religion but his own. He sees nature as something that is based on the individual and yet will only accept his ideas of where religion originates from

Schleiermacher, a legend in his own Zeitgeist

The issues confronted in the work of contextualizing religion within the period of enlightenment are still relevant today. Schleiermacher asks that we consider religion as something separate from the state and politics in order to see it in its truest form. In doing so in his Fifth Speech he refers specifically to Judaism, granting that although it is born in history its religious character is separate. I wonder what Schleiermacher would say about the Jewish state of Israel. How is Schleiermacher to be justified in considering Christianity to be “…more glorious, more sublime, more worthy of adult humanity, more deeply penetrating into the spirit of systematic religion, and extending farther over the whole universe”? His only defense seems to be in his historical and societal bias, yet upon what grounds should we consider the validity of his preceding notions of intuition as they are subject to the same vulnerabilities? It seems that Schleiermacher would like to simultaneously allow religion to be felt by individuals in a multiplicity of expressions while still maintaining that Christianity is the most conducive form. If we were to construct a spectrum of secularism with France on one end, Israel on the other and the United States somewhere in the middle which would most resemble the level of separation Schleiermacher had in mind? Furthermore Schleiermacher’s discussion of religious variety is limited to the “positive” western traditions. Would he allow that Buddhism or Islam is actually the truest representation of religious feeling today since they are most widespread? If Schleiermacher considers religion to be that which facilitates morality within a community how does he justify that the values of one religion to be more correct than another? For example in the United States in the case of gay marriage and abortion some would argue that religion is precisely amoral. Finally what is most troubling with the conclusion of Schleiermacher’s Fifth Speech is his allusion to the sanctity of the written word. According to Schleiermacher it seems the ability to understand a text is just as much the responsibility of the reader as it is of the writer. He does in fact seem rely on the temporal nature of what he writes allowing that his words are finite and the world will likely change. There seems to be an overall tone of neurotic awareness of his act of writing throughout the entire text.

Schleiermacher & Intuition

“For if you now, as I hope, pass a more favorable judgment on religion, if you realize that a special and noble human capacity lies at its core, which must consequently also be cultivated wherever it shows itself, then it cannot be offensive to you to intuit it in the determinate forms in which is has already actually appeared.”(p.98)

This passage is about religion and what Schleiermacher believes its purpose actually is.

In Schleiermacher’s fifth speech, he explains how religion is not just language, words, or even just a communion of people; but religion is almost like a direct way to reveal our true, noble nature as humans. According to Schleiermacher, religion is a system that connects humans to their own nature, intuition (feeling). Since intuition drives human beings to participate in the actions they partake in, as well as in the ideas they choose to feed; it can be said that intuition, or feeling, governs human beings. Although, taking into account all of the negative destructive qualities of human nature, religion acts as a filter that rationally understands our intuition and puts aside the “evil” traits to lead us into a nobler state of being.

At the core of every human is feeling, and Schleiermacher goes on to explain this intuition and how it is developed. Intuition is cultivated by “Observing yourself with unceasing effort. Detach all that is not yourself, always proceed with ever sharper sense, and the more you fade from yourself, the clearer the universe will stand forth before you, the more splendidly will you be recompensed for the horror of self-annihilation through the feeling of the infinite in you”(p.68) As I read this I questioned exactly what Schleiermacher meant by saying “detach all that is not yourself”, I came to the conclusion that anything and almost everything is not your actual true self. The clothes we wear, our cars, our girlfriends/boyfriends, the things we have accomplished, our jobs, are all extensions of our life; but these things are not our self, it seems as if the purpose of religion is to make us more instinctual and easy going, rather than being attached or identified with other objects/accomplishments/people. When you detach yourself from everything that is not yourself, you are free (as a human being); and in freedom your choices and possibilities are infinite.

When this nobility and core intuition is more developed in the human, the previous traits of religion that seemed offensive will be understood thoroughly. If one has developed intuition and nobility, he/she is bound to accept situations more frequently, and not be offended by them. With religious rationality being developed to guide humans and connect them with their intuition, the human can make nobler choices. As many followers of religion are deluded by “show” of it, many of them do not truly understand how to connect to themselves; these people may offend others because of their ignorance. However when intuition is developed in the being, he/she would see it and realize it. Then after realizing it, the possibilities or choices he/she can make will be infinite (whether to be offended by it, or not). It is as if you are the only person who has control over your intuition, and things that may have previously offended you are realized as separate objects/people; and if you are detached from the other thing, then it cannot have control over your intuition.

Nevertheless, according to Schleiermacher, the real purpose of religion is to detach humans from the exterior; and connect them with their own interior, or intuition. When this connection is cultivated, then things will appear infinite. However, is this connection something we strive for on a daily basis?

Is the Religious Feeling the Social Element of Religion?

“Once there is religion, it must necessarily be social. That not only lies in human nature but also preeminently in the nature of religion.” (73 Cambridge)

To Schleiermacher, religion is necessarily social because society is a part of human nature, and thus in the nature of religion. He provides multiple premises to support his claim and is tolerant of multiple religious views. However, he does not consider that while the feeling is common in human nature, the understanding of the feeling and of the infinite is what gives religion its social element.

In this philosophy of religion, the individual needs to communicate the religious feeling. One needs to make sure that it is not “alien” or “unworthy” of submission (73). The religious feeling is plausible if others can relate to it. And because others can relate, and by the same token testify to it, it is our “shared nature” (73). Thereby, in this view, communicating the feeling for verification makes it social. Schleiermacher does not account for the use of language and symbols in communicating the feeling. What makes the verification successful is if others understand it. Otherwise, the feeling is cast aside as absurd.

Another reason to communicate the religious feeling is because the feeling forces one out of oneself, so that one cannot know oneself through oneself alone (73). This aspect is the grasping of the infinitude of the feeling. Because it is bigger than the individual (since it is of the infinite), the individual gains impetus to spread the feeling. Schleiermacher claims this is not making others like ourselves, but simply sharing “particular events” common to human nature (73). Schleiermacher wants to account that the religious feeling is common to mankind, but does not consider that not everyone can relate to another’s religious feeling, merely because it is religious. What makes a religion is the representation of the object of worship, not the object itself, i.e. the infinite.

Schleiermacher himself maintains a high level of tolerance for other religious views, and he does not see the differences in representations as a complication. The most cultivated religions are more universal (77), and so the true church is an association of those who share the intuition of the infinite. If the feeling is truly of the infinite, it must be all encompassing. This is problematic, because it inadvertently implies that the bigger, or more “cultured”, a religious society is, the more truth it holds. The “smaller” representations of the infinite (tribes and small cults) are dismissed as less true. Schleiermacher does not actually see a common religious feeling. He is aiming at a common religious representation.

In Schleiermacher’s view, is the religious feeling the social element of religion? The feeling is necessary, but it is not the social element. What makes religion social is the understanding of the infinite, which comes from a common representation of it. Others must relate to the feeling that drives one out of oneself for it to not seem alien. And although Schleiermacher seems like he is universalizing the intuition, he may just be universalizing its representation.

Can Religion be Constructed within the Bounds of Bare Reason?

The claim that a rational philosophical religion is superior to a religion based on historical revelation is what Kant argues. But is it truly possible to construct a religion which is solely based on reason without any root in history?

Kant begins his construction of rational religion by positing that human beings are by nature radically evil. Human beings are evil because they chose to design their moral maxims not for the sake of the universal morality but for their own benefit and self love raising the individual above the universal. Human beings as a species are conscious and aware of the moral law, yet unconsciously but freely chose evil. This evil subsists in human beings before birth and will eternally be within humanity. Evil has a rational origin; it is apriori, transcends experience and has no cause within the boundaries of time. If the origin of evil exists within the boundaries of time then evil would be contingent on experience hence predetermined and it could not be said that humanity choose evil with freedom of the will.

In order to combat the evil in humanity, complete moral perfection needs to be maintained in humanity. This moral perfection is realized through God’s only begotten son. His complete moral perfection is a necessary condition in order for humanity to experience happiness. To achieve happiness as an end Kant postulates the existence of a supreme being with complete moral perfection. Furthermore in order to have an ethical community, where each individual chooses morality as a higher good for all of humanity, Kant argues that there must be someone above and beyond the people how knows, understands and is companionate to the heart of humanity i.e. the son of God.

Kant uses practical reason to postulate the existence of a perfect moral being and construct a philosophical religion so that this religion should be universal and not isolated to a particular history. But is this really what Kant has accomplished? It seems that some of the most pertinent concepts which Kant is using are borrowed from Christianity, which is a religion that has its own cultural history. Without the concepts of radical evil, the son of God and a people of God how would Kant be able to construct his philosophical religion. It seems that Kant’s religion is rooted in a particular history yet Kant wants his philosophical religion to be ahistorical. It seems as though there is a contradiction since Kant wants a philosophical religion which is not subject to the constraints of history yet he is using notions that are rooted in historical developments.

Kant might argue that once these notions exist, by whatever means, reason is free to do with it as it sees fit. But this would only be an admission that Kant’s ideas of religion are contingent on historical developments. It can be argued that every religion will have its own historical and cultural evolution. When applied to religion, reason is a tool which yields to principles which are already desirable and cultural norms for a given people.

Intuition: A Portal to Wonder or to Passivity?

In his second speech, Schleiermacher holds the idea of intuition as the central experience necessary for humanity to have religion. Unlike Kant, he regards the entirety of religion outside the realm of morality or metaphysics which he considers subordinate to it. Key to understanding the immediacy and seemingly all encompassing essence of religion is his notion of the intuition of the universe through which one, “should be able to find every place in religion from which [one] may determine its essence and its limits” (24).

Intuition seems to exist in the both in the realm of the infinite and finite as if when one is born, they are given a sense of the infinite which they might be able to recognize in their lifetime. Specifically intuition is, “what you thus intuit and perceive is not the nature of things, but their action upon you” (24). It is the immediate perception and apprehension of an object by an individual at any one moment. It proceeds from the influence of intuited and is, “grasped, apprehended, and conceived” by the one who intuits thereby, “awakening” a sense of the infinity of the universe in a person (24). In addition, in order for one to intuit they, “must necessarily be seized by various feelings” (29). By fusing emotions to intuition, Schleiermacher thereby makes someones sense of intuition impossible to be that of another's and through their drive to intuit the universe, they can become religious. Not religious in the sense of good and evil (which would be of the realm of morality) but in, “the particular manner in which the universe presents itself to you in your intuitions and determines the uniqueness of your individual religion” (29). However, Schleiermacher makes it clear that intuition is not to be confused with opinion which is of speculation or morality and are supposedly devoid of feeling.

Schleiermacher's assertions give rise to some questions for which he provides no clear answers. According to his definitions of intuition and opinion, if two people were to differ in matters of morality they would have differing opinions thereby limiting themselves to the finite, cut off from pulse of infinite religion. But two people with different intuitions are not limited because they feel the intuition of the universe. However, the moral are debating matters of good or evil while the religious do not bother themselves with such matters. Schleiermacher's virtuous portrayal of intuition lacks an explanation of why exactly this perception is as glorious as he describes and is not also equally possible of chaotic destruction. He places intuition on a mighty pedestal where, “Only the drive to intuit, if oriented to the infinite, places the mind in unlimited freedom; only religion saves it from the most ignominious fetters of opinion and desire” though it is not clear why opinion and morality is devoid of feeling which makes it separate from opinion (28). If religious feelings, “inhibit the strength of our action and invite us to calm and dedicated enjoyment” (30) then are the religious destined to be not ones of action but rather passive admirers indifferent to war or peace but always preoccupied in the ecstasy of the infinite? Hopefully, class discussion and further reading will illuminate more of Schleiermacher's notions of intuition and religion.

Kant Hates the Pope, Part II

My last post contained a general, non-controversial interpretation of a passage by Kant that was decorated nicely with images meant to disguise my rather shallow, non-threatening treatment of Kant’s philosophy. I did promise, however, that there would be an exciting conclusion… and here is a conclusion, although not a very exciting one:

Kant notices a paradox in his system, and tries to address it head-on, namely if historical religion is above pure rational religious faith or whether it is a mere vehicle which follows inevitably from pure religious faith (117 marginal/ 129 Hackett). Kant says the latter is true, and that a true universal church based on moral religion alone would eventually be able to do away with historical elements. However, ecclesiastical scripture seems necessary for illuminating pure moral faith, and Kant himself relies on scripture often.

However, in my view, these distinctions seem unnecessary and confusing, and Kant’s moral proof for God is unconvincing.

Kant renders God impotent in the causal, empirical world, but gives him judgment over mankind in an unknowable transcendental world. But, if we remove God from the moral equation all together, say in favor of the social contract espoused by Hobbes, or say even a neo-Kantian ideal like Rawl’s fairness principle, we are still able to explain and judge morality without God's interference. Therefore, it seems, we could discard God altogether or instead, the concept of God could only be based on revelation. If we follow reason we would surely do away with God altogether.

Kant Hates the Pope, Part I

“There is only one (true) religion; but there can be many kinds of faith. –One may say, further, that in the various churches, set apart from each other because of the difference in their kinds of faith, one and the same true religion may nonetheless be found” (107-108 marginal/ 118 Hackett).

Kant’s insight that there is some underlying mystical truth uniting all religious faiths at their core is not unique, nor is it an idea he originated. For instance it can be found as early as the 10^th century B.C. in the Rigveda, which states “The One Truth, the sages call by many names.”

However, Kant has something different in mind. His mystical truth is based solely in morality, and God acts only as an arbiter of justice, not as a unifying principal. In fact, Kant thinks the only real justification for God is by way of morality, since morality can be rational only if there is a system of reward and punishment, and subsequently there must be a God to reward or punish the moral agent.

Kant’s God therefore is clearly different from the typical description found in biblical portrayals. In fact, Kant rejects any explanation of God based on supernatural revelation, finding historical or ecclesiastical religions that reward servitude or allegiance immoral and all religious rituals to be bogus spectacles.

What, then, is Kant offering instead?

The exciting conclusion still to come...